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The majority of the world‟s poorest people live and work in rural areas. The 2008 World Bank 
World Development Report „Agriculture for Development’ puts the figure at 75%1. Regional 
differences are striking, ranging from 41% of poor people living in rural areas in Latin America 
and Caribbean to almost 93% in East Asia and Pacific region2.  
 
Definitions of urban and rural differ by country, and lines between the two can be blurred, for 
example in peri-urban areas people often pursue livelihood strategies that are akin to more 
rural settings, while rural towns might provide opportunities for rural non-farm incomes for 
people living in villages. There are often strong links and dependencies between rural and 
urban areas, through migration and flows of remittances and goods.  
 
Rural poverty has particular characteristics. The livelihoods and survival of rural people 
depend heavily on agriculture and other rural sectors strongly reliant on natural resources. 
Weather-related shocks and stresses and risks associated with seasonality are intrinsic to 
rural livelihoods tied intimately to agricultural production. As a result, rural livelihoods tend to 
be characterised by risk, shocks and stresses, including economic shocks such as changing 
market prices and climate-related risks, which may lead to drought or repeated flooding. The 
poorest people are often the most vulnerable people to these shocks and stresses, though 
coping and risk management strategies are widespread. Poor people in rural areas also tend 
to suffer poverty over long time periods, with more limited income-generating opportunities 
compared to people in urban areas. Access to services and infrastructure is usually limited 
(Ravallion et al, 2007). 
 
This research paper, IDS‟ contribution to the Global Assessment Report on Disaster 
Reduction (GAR), examines links between disaster risk and poverty trends to inform the 
central analysis of the GAR/DRR, illustrating the dynamics of the disaster-poverty interface. 
The paper looks at the disaster risk – poverty interface through the lens of rural livelihoods 
and sustainability, providing a framework for assessing rural poverty and disaster risk, 
encompassing research, detailed analysis, and case study materials. The main sections are: 
 
 Relationship between rural poverty and hazard exposure 
 Contribution of rural poverty to vulnerability 
 Relationships between urban and rural disaster risks 
 Climate change: threat and opportunity for rural poverty and disaster risk 
 Approaches to co-managing rural poverty and disaster risk 
 Policy recommendations 
 
Underpinning each of these sections is a consideration of risk and resilience in rural lives and 
livelihoods. 
 
The rural analysis presented here is set within a livelihoods framework, embodying notions of 
wellbeing as the absence of poverty. Livelihoods approaches as frameworks for  
conceptualising poverty and risk are informed by Sen‟s work on endowments, entitlements 
and capabilities (REF). In a given context, encompassing politics and policy processes and 
agro-ecological conditions, livelihoods approaches consider what combinations of capitals - 
human, financial, social, political, natural - are necessary to follow different livelihoods 
strategies and achieve different outcomes. In particular it considers the role of institutions and 
institutional dynamics, both formal and informal, in mediating capabilities and improving 
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wellbeing (Ellis, 1998; Scoones, 1998). As such, livelihoods approaches embody multi-
dimensional concepts of poverty. 
 
Key messages from this study for the Global Assessment Report 
The following messages are highlighted within this study and are some of the authors‟ 
recommendations for transferring in to the Global Assessment Report. There are many other 
important points raised in this report, which are presented in Chapter 6: Summary and 
Recommendations.  
 
 There is a decline in the $1-a-day poverty rate in developing countries overall, from 
28% in 1993 to 22% in 2002, largely due to falling rural poverty. However, this fall in 
the number of poor people in rural areas has been in the East Asia and Pacific region, 
and in other regions, notably Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia, rural poverty is rising 
(World Bank, 2007:3).  
 
 Rural poverty, like all poverty, is multidimensional. Notions of poverty expand beyond 
economic, material concepts of income and consumption to encompass experiential 
and psychological dimensions, such as access to services, feelings of social exclusion 
and lack of political rights. Consequently, the authors favour the concept of wellbeing 
within a livelihoods framework, with „wellbeing‟ constituting an absence of poverty and 
a) access to assets, (b) ability to obtain an income, (c) access to services and (d) 
empowerment. 
 
 The livelihoods and survival of rural people depend heavily on agriculture and other 
rural sectors strongly reliant on natural resources. Weather-related shocks and 
stresses and risks associated with seasonality are intrinsic to rural livelihoods tied 
intimately to agricultural production.  
 
 Exposure to hazards undermines livelihoods, simultaneously causing and exacerbating 
rural poverty. Conversely, a hazard is more likely to impact negatively on an already 
compromised livelihood system, because resilience and ability to cope are diminished. 
Poverty is itself hazardous. Low incomes raise vulnerability to hazards, because the 
poor are less able to cope effectively with shocks to their fragile livelihoods. 
 
 Rural poverty and vulnerability reinforce each other. Everyone is vulnerable to food 
insecurity, social exclusion and natural disasters, but the rural poor are more 
vulnerable because they are more exposed to these risks and are more likely to 
experience a larger and more prolonged (even irreversible) impact due to their limited 
(physical, financial, social and political) assets.  
 
 Assets usually increase wellbeing and reduce vulnerability to livelihood shocks. In 
some perverse cases assets can increase vulnerability, but these are unusual 
circumstances.  
 
 The importance of voice and influence over people with power cannot be overstated; it 
is critical for determining whether rural poor people must attempt to cope with disasters 
and disaster risk on their own or can count on external assistance in times of stress. 
When such assistance is guaranteed – for instance, where predictable and social 
security systems provide effective safety nets against shocks – the catastrophic 
consequences of disasters can be substantially contained. 
 
 While climate change is commonly presented as a gradual shift in climatic trends, its 
impacts will be most strongly felt by poor rural communities through changes in the 




changes will require bolstering disaster risk reduction as a first line of defence, 
including disaster prevention as well as response.  
 
 It is impossible to divorce measures for improving rural wellbeing from measures 
designed to reduce rural disaster risk. Such measures must build-up the asset base of 
(poor) people in rural areas to act as buffers against shocks and help reduce 
vulnerability to hazards. These include measures that not only strengthen existing 
asset bases but also those that enable people to create/access assets, such as 
essential inputs for farming, irrigation; 
 
 If households resort to „distress‟ coping strategies involving the sale of critical assets 
when face with disasters or disaster risk, rebuilding assets must be tackled in a timely 






1. The Relationship between Rural Poverty and Hazard Exposure 
This section examines the complex relationship between rural poverty and exposure to 
hazards. We detail where the rural poor live, we define what we mean by wellbeing (or the 
absence of poverty) and discuss the rural-specific characteristics of poverty. This leads us to 
examine sources and impacts of hazards and stresses in poor rural people‟s livelihoods.3 We 
then consider responses to these hazards and stresses, or „coping strategies‟, in the context 
of rural peoples‟ dynamic livelihood strategies. 
1.1 Who are ‘the rural poor’? 
This section explores rural poverty, situating rural poor people both spatially and in relation to 
their livelihoods. Notions of poverty are expanded beyond economic, material concepts of 
income and consumption to encompass wellbeing across multiple dimensions, including 
experiential and psychological. 
 
A synthesis of the findings of „Consultations with the poor‟ shows that poor people in both rural 
and urban areas experience ill-being in multiple ways, going beyond standard economic 
definitions of income and material consumption poverty based on yardsticks such as a dollar a 
day and encompassing bad experiences, and “bad feelings about the self”. By contrast,  
“Wellbeing was variously expressed as happiness, harmony, peace, freedom from anxiety, 
and peace of mind…For many, too, spiritual life and religious observance were woven in with 
other aspects of wellbeing” (Narayan et al, 1999: 3). While the nature of illbeing and poverty is 
context and person-specific, there are also commonalities in people‟s experiences that 
transcend different countries and cultures, including rural and urban areas, as well as age and 
gender divides4.  
 
Turning to material poverty, a recent World Bank study by Ravallion et al (2007) drew on over 
200 household surveys in 90 developing countries, and other sources, to examine trends in 
income poverty disaggregated by rural and urban areas. They found that of people living on 
$1 a day or less, the proportion in urban areas rose over the decade between 1993 and 2002, 
from 19 % to 24%, as did the urban share of the population, from 38 to 42%.   
 
Regional differences are striking. Poverty is becoming more urbanised at the fastest rate in 
Latin America. Here, the majority of poor people now live in urban areas. In East Asia, on the 
other hand, less than 10% of poor people live in urban areas, and data for some countries and 
regions suggest poverty is becoming more ruralised – for example in China and in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia (Ravallion et al 2007). Tables 1 and 2 show urban and rural poverty 
headcounts and poverty gap indices disaggregated by rural and urban areas. 
 
Table 1.1a: Urban and rural income poverty 2002 (poverty line = $1.08/day, 1993 PPP) 











Urban  Rural Total Urban  Rural Total 
East-Asia and Pacific 16.27 223.23 239.50 2.28 19.83 13.03 6.79 38.79 
China 4.00 175.01 179.01 0.80 22.44 13.98 2.24 37.68 
Eastern-Europe and 
Central Asia 
2.48 4.94 7.42 0.83 2.87 1.57 33.40 63.45 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
38.33 26.60 64.93 9.49 21.15 12.26 59.03 76.24 
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 For this section we draw extensively on work by Sabates-Wheeler et al. (2008). 
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 ‘Consultations with the Poor’ was a global endeavour across 23 developing countries using participatory 
research to uncover voices of the poor including their experiences, priorities, reflections and recommendations, 
and incorporate them into the 2000/2001 World Bank World Development Report. For a synthesis of findings see 




Middle East and North 
Africa 
1.21 4.88 6.09 0.75 3.82 2.11 19.87 55.75 
South Asia 125.40 394.34 519.74 32.21 39.05 37.15 24.13 27.83 
India 106.64 316.42 423.06 36.20 41.96 40.34 25.21 28.09 
Sub-Saharan Africa 98.84 228.77 327.61 40.38 50.86 47.17 30.17 35.24 
Total 282.52 882.77 1165.29 12.78 29.32 22.31 24.24 42.34 
Source: Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2007).  
 
Table 1.1b: Urban and rural poverty gap indices 2002 (poverty line = $1.08/day, 1993 PPP) 
 Poverty gap index (%) 
Urban  Rural Total Urban share of 
Poverty Gap (%) 
East-Asia and Pacific 0.54 4.42 2.92 7.16 
China 0.238 4.96 3.11 2.99 
Eastern-Europe and 
Central Asia 
0.21 0.67 0.38 34.82 
Latin America and 
Caribbean 
3.01 8.60 4.33 52.86 
Middle East and North 
Africa 
0.15 0.74 0.41 19.98 
South Asia 8.67 9.18 9.04 26.71 
India 10.04 10.03 10.03 28.10 
Sub-Saharan Africa 16.67 22.53 20.46 28.70 
Total 4.13 8.53 6.67 26.25 
Source: Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2007).  
 
The same data show a decline in the $1-a-day poverty rate in developing countries overall, 
from 28% in 1993 to 22% in 2002, largely due to falling rural poverty. Urban poverty has 
stayed relatively constant at around 13%. However, this fall in the number of poor people in 
rural areas has been in the East Asia and Pacific region, and in other regions, notably Sub-
Saharan Africa and South Asia, rural poverty is rising (World Bank, 2007:3). Projections 
suggest that it will be decades before most poor people in developing countries are living in 
urban areas. For the foreseeable future, poverty remains a largely rural phenomenon in the 
developing world.   
 
In terms of absolute numbers of people, over half of the developing world‟s population (5.5 
billion people) lives in rural areas (3 billion people). Half of the rural population are in 
smallholder farming households, and in all around 86% of rural people are in households 
where livelihoods are connected to agriculture in some way, either through farming or working 
in the sector (World Bank, 2007: 3-4).  Rural poor people, therefore, can fit a range of „profiles‟ 
ranging from smallholders, pastoralists, workers on plantations or smaller farms growing either 
food or cash crops for domestic consumption or export, engaging in on-farm, off-farm and 
non-farm activities including services, and living in rural towns, villages, and more remote 
places.  
1.2 Characteristics of Rural Poverty 
Wellbeing, or the absence of poverty, is best conceptualised within a livelihoods framework.5  
A livelihood is defined as „the activities, the assets and the access that jointly determine the 
living gained by an individual or household‟ (Ellis, 1999).6 The livelihoods literature has 
poverty reduction (and wellbeing) and engagement in the productive economy as its central 
focus. Fundamental to the livelihood approach is the asset or resource status of individuals 
and households. Assets provide capabilities for achieving satisfactory levels of living. Typically 
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 The literature on wellbeing and the ‘wellbeing approach’ derives from the work of Sen (for instance, 1990, 1993, 
2006).  Recent theorists to explore this concept include Clark (2003, 2005) and McGregor (2005, 2006). 
6
 The livelihoods approach emerged out of the work of Chambers and Conway (1992); Carney (1998); 




this means that the household is the unit of analysis, whereby the household and its 
corresponding resource profile is located within the context of the wider „vulnerability‟ 
environment (external influences such as hazards and shocks will cause livelihoods to be 
compromised and lead to adaptation strategies), the context of social vulnerabilities (such as 
age, ethnic status, gender that causally impact how livelihoods are constructed and adapted) 
and within the policy and institutional context.7  Rural livelihood diversification is defined as 
„the process by which households construct an increasingly diverse portfolio of activities and 
assets in order to survive and improve their standard of living [or wellbeing]‟ (Ellis, 1998; 2000, 
p.15). 
 
Figure 1.2a (below) illustrates the dimensions that coalesce and reinforce each other to create 
a state of wellbeing within the livelihoods framework as detailed above. Wellbeing constitutes: 
1. access to assets such as land, credit, and social assets such as friends and family; 
2. ability to obtain an income; 
3. access to services and; 
4. empowerment, or the ability to make „voice‟ heard. 
 
Absence of poverty in this framework is defined along multiple dimensions (not just income) .  
For instance, we see that assets, access to services and political rights and power are 
important in defining wellbeing in a holistic way.  The vulnerability context, which influences 
access to „productive factors‟ that determine wellbeing, is made up of 1) social dimensions 
such as gender, class, age, disability; 2) political dimensions such as laws, policies and 
institutions that present structural barriers to achieving wellbeing; and 3) hazards, such as 
conflict, climate change, and economic crises. Political and social dimensions may reinforce 
each other.  For instance, political marginalisation and social exclusion (based on ascriptive 
factors such as caste, race, and gender) could influences means of production and attributes 
of risk. Not all dimensions of wellbeing have to be fully met in order to achieve an absence of 
poverty, but all dimensions are critical in achieving wellbeing. The specific components and 
thresholds that make up any one individuals‟ or household‟s wellbeing will vary by context; 
however a minimum level of certain components, such as food, water, health care, shelter and 
education are likely to define the minimum threshold below which individuals and households 
across all contexts can be seen as poor. 
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 This could equally apply to individuals however the household has traditionally been the unit of analysis. 
EMPOWERMENT 
 - Political say 
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SERVICES 
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If poverty is defined as an inability to construct and maintain a viable livelihood, then rural 
poverty must be analysed in relation to rural livelihood systems. A defining characteristic of the 
rural poor is their lack of productive assets needed to maximise their income. Smallholder 
farmers, for instance, often face constrained access to: 
 
 land – because of land pressure (especially in highly food insecure regions such as 
southern Malawi or highland Ethiopia), or the absence of tenure rights; 
 labour – because the poorest households are those with high dependency ratios and 
limited adult labour power, such as „skip generation‟ households containing only very old 
and very young members; 
 inputs – because imported fertiliser and improved seeds are expensive, government 
subsidies have mostly been removed, and input credit is not readily available; 
 irrigation – because of the high cost of installing irrigation systems, leaving farmers 
exposed and dependent on unpredictable and unreliable rainfall; 
 financial services – because banks won‟t lend to small farmers who lack collateral 
because they have no rights over the land they farm, and insurers won‟t provide crop 
insurance because of „moral hazard‟, asymmetric information and covariate risk. 
The consequence of this constrained access to essential inputs for farming – land, labour, 
water, fertilisers, seeds, credit – is „low input, low output‟ agriculture. Poor farmers apply 
sub-optimal levels of inputs to their fields and harvest extremely low yields – cereal yields in 
Malawi are one-tenth of average cereal yields in the United States (FAO, 2008b), for instance, 
where high levels of mechanisation means that harvests are both higher and more stable than 
in Africa. Low crop yields result in low incomes and chronic food insecurity, which leaves 
farming families close to the poverty line (sometimes above it and sometimes below), and 
acutely vulnerable to the smallest hazard or shock. 
 
Rural poverty is primarily an outcome of the structural characteristics that are common to the 
livelihoods of most poor rural people, as summarised in Figure 1.2b. 
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Source: Dorward et al. (2006) (* Threshold effects important – see text; Bold type indicates major 
feature of poor rural livelihoods) 
 
Processes of change, which include hazard exposure such as climatic variations and price 
changes; but also include cyclical change such as seasonal fluctuations feature largely in rural 
poor livelihoods. This is discussed in detail below. 
 
Another feature of poor rural livelihoods (highlighted in the figure above) is their location in 
imperfect and thin markets. Ellis, 1993 defines peasants in terms of their partial integration 
into imperfect and often personalised markets, while Dorward and Kydd, 2004 argue that poor 
rural areas are characterised by (inter alia) low levels of economic activity, thin markets and 
weak and costly coordination in exchange. These institutional and market characteristics 
contribute to uncertainty and vulnerability in terms both of wider market behaviour (with wilder 
price swings in response to local changes in production, for example) and of transaction risks 
(with buyers and sellers subject to risks of opportunism, coordination failure and rent seeking 
in exchange. Imperfect (costly and risky) markets are then an important cause for rural people 
constructing livelihoods in which they engage in a multiple activities to meet their diverse 
social and economic needs (for example subsistence production may be cheaper and less 
risky than reliance on markets to meet food needs). An example from Bangladesh of the risks 
associated with market failure is highlighted in Box 1.2.  
 
Box 1.2 Markets and risk in Bangladesh 
One of the most dramatic examples of market-related risk in the context of a natural disaster 
occurred in Bangladesh in 1974/75. Exaggerated predictions of a poor rice harvest due to 
flooding caused excessive quantities of rice to be withdrawn from the market and stored, for 
either precautionary or speculative purposes. The immediate consequence was that a minor 
production shortfall became a massive shortfall in market supplies. Prices rose rapidly to 
levels that were unaffordable for the poor. Up to 1.5 million people died because they were 
priced out of the market and had no alternative source of food or income. Landless labourers, 
especially agricultural workers, were worst affected, because they were entirely dependent 
on the market for their staple food. As rice prices escalated, so the purchasing power of 
wages fell precipitously, leaving the market-dependent poor unable to meet their subsistence 
needs. 
Source: Sen (1981) 
 
Market-related risks tend to be related to distance from urban centres. People living in „remote 
rural areas‟ are more likely to face imperfect or missing markets than are people living closer 
to urban centres, and this remoteness in itself contributes to chronic poverty and vulnerability 
(Bird, et al., 2002). Conversely, as discussed below (in section 3.1), proximity to urban centres 
creates opportunities for market deepening and urban-rural integration (including mutually 
beneficial exchange of commodities and services), leading to reduced risk for rural dwellers. 
 
Further complexity arises from the existence of various thresholds in rural livelihoods and in 
the economies within which they are situated. Changes that cross thresholds can have very 
different qualitative and quantitative effects from changes which do not cross thresholds. For 
instance, „asset thresholds‟ arise in individual livelihoods, where certain sets (or amounts) of 
assets are needed to engage in particular activities and/or to support particular levels of 
welfare, leading to poverty traps for households without these minimum asset sets/amounts.  
 
The interaction of multiple objectives, multiple activities and multiple dimensions of predictable 
and unpredictable change means that poor rural livelihoods tend to be inherently complex so 




Complexity and exposure to uncertainty, together with poverty lead to high vulnerability and 
risk. 
 
Next we focus on hazard exposure and stress, and explore the way that this fundamental 
characteristic of rural livelihoods interacts with rural poverty. 
 
1.3 Hazard exposure 
A prominent feature of rural livelihoods is their exposure to a variety of types and processes of 
change, with shocks, trends, cycles (particularly seasonal cycles) and „normal‟ random 
variation occurring in many different dimensions. All these changes and variations can be 
viewed through the lens of „hazards‟, where for the purpose of this paper we define hazards as 
events which, if they materialise, can adversely affect wellbeing.  The context within which 
rural people and households operate and cope is both defined and affected by their exposure 
to shocks and hazards. Hazards affect rural poverty through effects on prices, resource 
availability, resource productivity, and livelihood opportunities. Some of these hazards are 
predictable in their occurrence while others are not. Similarly, some of the effects of change 
resulting from hazards are predictable while others are not. 
 
Hazards may be covariate (operating at macro and meso levels and affecting large numbers 
of communities and/ or people) or more idiosyncratic (affecting individual communities, 
households or people). Hazards arise within livelihoods, again with different patterns, 
dimensions and predictability. Some are the direct result of changes in exogenous factors 
(such as those as discussed above) while others are more (but seldom completely) 
endogenous – for example, accumulation or loss of assets as a result of household members‟ 
actions; or births, marriages and growing up and ageing processes affecting household 
demographics, consumption needs and labour resources. New types and sources of change 
are also constantly emerging and affecting rural livelihoods in new ways because of global 
and local processes and crises, including market liberalisation, potential impacts of climate 
change, the HIV/AIDS pandemic, civil conflict, and some aspects of the globalisation of 
agricultural trade. 
 
It is important here to differentiate between the many diverse forms that rural livelihoods can 
take. For instance, in subsistence-oriented smallholder economies, a primary source of risk is 
weather shocks that undermine production of staple crops grown for family consumption. 
However, in plantation agriculture, where crops are grown mainly for export (e.g. nutmeg, 
rubber, sugar), major risks include the loss of an entire crop (as with nutmeg in Grenada), a 
collapse in world prices, or liberalisation that exposes producers to global market forces with 
inadequate protection (as affected cashew growers in Mozambique in the 1990s (Macmillan, 
et al., 2002)). Also, many rural livelihoods are derived from tourism, but these livelihoods are 
vulnerable to weather shocks – like recurrent hurricanes in Central America, or the tsunami in 
South Asia – that can devastate the local tourism sector for months or even years. 
 
Many of the direct costs and losses from hazards are self-evident and need little discussion: 
floods, drought or hail may cause crop losses while births, sickness, accident, disability, old 
age or schooling may lead in different ways to predictable and unpredictable increases in 
living costs and reductions in production or earnings. However, these immediate losses of 
assets and earnings may have far-reaching „knock on‟ effects on other activities and asset 
holdings in rural households, effects which may not be so immediately obvious but which may 
be more damaging, particularly when poor rural people are forced into increasingly 
unsustainable responses in order to smooth their income or consumption. Distress sales of 
assets, for example, can act as „poverty ratchets‟, with irrecoverable losses of productive 
resources below asset thresholds locking people into poverty or low-level traps from which 
they cannot escape without external transfers. Box 1.3 describes such a situation in Honduras 





Box 1.3 Natural disasters and poverty traps in Honduras 
When Hurricane Mitch struck Central America in 1998 it not only caused tragic loss of life, it 
also destroyed crops, livestock and other productive assets, undermining the livelihood base 
of poor rural households and impoverishing them further. Some 30 months later, a survey of 
850 households assessed the longer-term economic impact of this environmental shock. The 
survey found that wealthier households were more likely to have lost assets during Hurricane 
Mitch – they had more assets to lose – but that poorer households lost greater proportions of 
their productive assets, mainly land. This resulted in lost production and agricultural income, 
but it also pushed many households below a critical „asset threshold‟ which left them with 
inadequate productive resources to accumulate wealth – a „poverty trap‟ from which there 
was no escape. The study concluded that the asset shocks that are inevitably associated 
with natural disasters can have long-term impoverishing consequences. 
Source: Carter et al. (2008) 
  
This effect is highlighted during a period of livelihood stress or crisis, to which people respond 
by engaging in „coping strategies‟ such as borrowing, selling assets, rationing food 
consumption, or withdrawing children from school. The consequence of adopting such 
„erosive‟ coping strategies is that the household‟s ability to generate future livelihoods is 
compromised, because its productive resource base has been compromised. When the next 
shock strikes, the household has fewer options and will again be forced to shed assets to 
survive. Over time, the „poverty ratchet‟ effect that repeated shocks have on increasingly 
weakened livelihoods steadily undermines the ability to recover, and pushes people towards 
chronic poverty and destitution. This combination of recurrent shocks and chronic 
impoverishment may affect increasing numbers of people in rainfall-dependent rural areas of 
sub-Saharan Africa, south Asia and elsewhere, as a consequence of climate change. 
 
Once again, as noted above and in section 3 below, the extent to which rural livelihoods are 
independent of, or integrated with, urban livelihoods and markets is critical to understanding 
their relative vulnerability. Households with diversified sources of income and strong linkages 
to urban markets (including urban-based employment opportunities) are better protected 
against weather fluctuations that can undermine agricultural production and rural incomes, but 
typically have only limited impact on urban economic activity and incomes. 
 
Two factors that are major determinants of the vulnerability context of rural individuals and 
households are seasonality and HIV/AIDS. 
 
Vulnerability factor #1: Seasonality 
Seasonality constitutes a stress or hazard in the lives of rural people and is a source of 
poverty and vulnerability for rural families throughout Africa and Asia. Dependence on a single 
main harvest for most of the family‟s annual food and income exposes these families to 
enormous risk in the event of erratic weather, such as a drought or flood – even a brief break 
in the rains at a key stage of the growing cycle can spell disaster. Even in good rainfall years, 
the annual „hungry season‟ can last for several months. This is a time of high food prices, 
hunger, malnutrition and debilitating diseases such as diarrhoea and malaria. There are few 
employment opportunities; most available work is low-paid agricultural labour, which can only 
be undertaken at the cost of neglecting the family‟s own farm, which sets up a „poverty ratchet‟ 
of low-yielding harvests, working on neighbouring farms for food, and further under-production 
in future years. 
 
Food price rises are a significant source of risk for all poor families who depend on the market 
for their food. This applies not just to urban consumers but also to small-scale farmers whose 




subsistence needs, and must cover some proportion of their families‟ food requirements by 
buying food from local markets. Even worse, many farmers are forced into selling some of 
their food production at low prices after harvest to meet urgent cash needs, only to buy this 
food back later in the year at two or three times the selling price, to bridge the consumption 
gap before the next harvest. This is a classic symptom of seasonality in tropical agricultural 
systems. Surplus producers profit from price rises, because their income from crop sales 
increases, but deficit producers are impoverished by having to buy food at high prices (see 
Figure 1.3, which illustrates the differential impact of a maize price increase on net producers 
and net consumers in rural Malawi.) This analysis applies equally to regular, predictable 
seasonality and to unforeseen shocks like the current „high food prices‟ issue. 
 
Figure 1.3 Projected effect of a 10% increase in maize prices on the welfare  




































Source: FAO (2008a) 
 
 
Vulnerability factor #2: HIV and AIDS 
The example of HIV and AIDS is instructive for drawing out this complex relationship. First, 
exposure to HIV can undermine livelihoods, which exacerbates poverty: HIV infects an 
individual but has wide repercussions on the family, community and ultimately the nation. HIV 
and AIDS has the greatest impact on „productive‟ members of a society by directly 
undermining their ability to work, increasing the number of dependents in a household. This 
has a dual effect of decreasing household productivity directly (and income) and indirectly, by 
increasing the caring burden of other household members. It also interrupts the 
intergenerational transfer of knowledge and skills (e.g. farming skills, health knowledge, 
exchange of ideas and tools). These effects have knock-on impacts on assets (which are sold 
in order to fund medical, caring and living expenses), shrinking livelihood opportunities, 
increasing vulnerability and poverty. As income dries up, savings are run down, assets are 
liquidated and coping strategies becoming increasingly more irreversible, ultimately leading to 
assetlessness, destitution and family disintegration. More risky coping mechanisms are then 
employed, further promoting the likelihood of contracting HIV and AIDS. 
 
As more and more households are affected by HIV/AIDS and AIDS-related illnesses, the 
networks and informal mechanisms that initially provide support to AIDS-affected people are 
shrinking and are being stretched at every level, from extended family to community to 
national. Other community-level organisations are also affected. The impact on the public 
health sector, as health workers fall chronically ill or leave to care for other family members, 
means that clinics have lower levels of qualified staff. This undermines preventative health 
care and puts extra burden on formal institutions for health provisioning. In this sense, the HIV 





Second, HIV and AIDS impacts households differentially. Most low-income countries face 
problems with health service delivery, so people in poor countries are more vulnerable to the 
untreated consequences of HIV and AIDS. Even if treatment is available within the country 
(increasingly, for instance, ARVs are provided free of charge), poor people living in isolated 
rural communities are the least able to access this, because of lack of transport or high costs 
of travel, limited knowledge of available medicines ,and stigma around HIV infection. In short, 
access to medical help for dealing with health hazards is more difficult for poor people. 
 
Similarly, resilience to HIV and AIDS and its impacts are not wealth or gender neutral. Shocks 
affect poor families more than the rich because of their limited financial and physical asset 
base and their lack of insurance. Compounding this, poorer vulnerable groups are often 
excluded from institutional access and have little political voice. All this together with their lack 
of human capital leads to further poverty and higher susceptibility to HIV infection, either 
because they need to resort to lifestyles that make them more vulnerable (e.g. transactional 
sex, or unprotected sex due to lack of access to condoms), or because they are malnourished 
– evidence confirms a strong link between malnutrition and susceptibility to infection by the HI 
virus. Furthermore, inadequate nutrition of mothers can raise risks of mother-to-child-
transmission via pregnancy, birth or breast feeding. Women are also more susceptible to HIV 
infection than men, due to both biological and cultural factors. This shows that the impacts of 
generic hazards are modified by social position and other context-specific variables. 
 
1.4 Coping with hazards 
As noted above, rural households respond to seasonal food insecurity and livelihood shocks 
by adopting a range of behavioural adjustments that are collectively known as „coping 
strategies‟. These strategies either secure additional food (by selling assets, begging, 
borrowing or buying food) or adjust to having less food (by rationing or diversifying diets) – but 
they have economic, nutritional, social and environmental costs. Typically, the adoption of 
these strategies follows a predictable and logical sequence, starting with low-cost strategies 
that are easily reversed, such as mild rationing, cutting back on non-essential spending, or 
selling livestock off-take to buy food. These are followed by strategies that have higher cost 
and are less easily reversed, such as selling breeding livestock, or borrowing at high interest 
rates, or begging from friends and neighbours (which has „social costs‟ in terms of lost social 
status and self-respect). Finally, once these strategies are exhausted, families must sell their 
key productive assets (such as farmland) and migrate to survive. 
 
This sequence has been observed and recorded in many countries during many hungry 
seasons and famines. The example below comes from the southern African drought of 1992 
(Figure 1.4). Affected households in Namibia immediately rationed their food consumption. 
When more drastic action was needed they cut non-food spending, borrowed food or cash to 
buy food, and sold or bartered their assets for food. Asking for help was a last resort before 
migrating in search of food or work elsewhere. 
 













Source: Devereux (2007) 
 
The crucial point about these coping strategies is that they are responses to poverty and food 
insecurity that actually exacerbate poverty and food insecurity. In fact, severe coping 
strategies represent a failure of coping with hazards. Households that are forced to sell their 
assets for food are consuming their wealth. Converting future streams of income into 
consumption goods is impoverishing and undermines future livelihood viability. So these 
responses to shocks help households to survive in the short term but at the cost of leaving 
them more vulnerable to future shocks. The literature on coping strategies reveals that poor 
households living in hazardous environments are well aware of these trade-offs between 
short-run and long-run survival, and their behavioural adjustments do everything possible to 
minimise the long-run damage of responses to immediate threats. However, some strategies, 
especially those that are environmentally damaging, inadvertently magnify future hazard 
levels. Examples include cutting firewood and burning charcoal for sale, two livelihood 
activities that are widely adopted by poor people but can destroy vegetation and contribute to 
soil erosion. Overgrazing has similar consequences, while over-extraction of groundwater that 
lowers the water table can also raise the risk of future agricultural droughts. 
1.5 Conclusion 
As illustrated by the examples of seasonality and AIDS, the relationship between rural poverty 
and hazards is complex and interconnected. Exposure to a hazard undermines livelihoods, 
simultaneously causing and exacerbating poverty. On the other hand, a hazard is more likely 
to impact negatively on an already compromised livelihood system, because resilience and 
ability to cope are diminished. In other words, the impacts of a hazard are unequally felt 
across different wellbeing maps, with poorer people and households more likely to experience 
negative and more severe impacts from a hazard than better-off groups. Poverty is itself 
hazardous. Low incomes raise vulnerability to hazards, because the poor are less able to 
cope effectively with shocks to their fragile livelihoods. 
 
2. Contribution of Rural Poverty to Vulnerability 
Above we examined how hazards and stresses impact on rural livelihoods. In this section we 
discuss what we mean by vulnerability and examine how rural poverty contributes to, and 
exacerbates, a variety of vulnerabilities and hazards. 
2.1 Vulnerability 
Vulnerability is often conceptualised as a product of two components: exposure to hazard (a 
shock or process) and resilience, or the ability to manage a hazard. From the perspective of 
the rural poor, hazards could include natural shocks such as drought, economic shocks such 




„coping strategies‟ at the individual, household, community and group levels. People can 
protect themselves against the risk that a hazard will undermine their livelihoods by drawing 
on savings, diversifying their livelihoods to spread risk, building social networks that pool risk 
and provide informal assistance in times of need, and so on. When all these defensive risk 
coping mechanisms fail, people become acutely vulnerable, even to minor shocks. At this 
point, they become dependent on public risk management or „risk coping‟ interventions, such 
as emergency food aid. Importantly, resilience means the ability to cope with shocks and 
hazards without compromising the viability of the household. If coping mechanisms are 
adopted that erode the key productive resources of the household, resilience against future 
shocks and hazards will be reduced. Conversely, if effective safety nets or social insurance 
mechanisms are in place, damaging coping strategies can be avoided and poor households 
can protect rather than lose their assets. This is why the rapidly evolving social protection 
agenda has enormous potential for addressing both poverty and vulnerability. 
 
Understanding vulnerability in two-dimensional space is important as it illustrates the very 
different policy responses that should be taken in relation to what constitutes the vulnerability 
of any one person, household, community, or „vulnerable group‟. It is particularly useful for 
acute situations requiring an immediate response. That is, at any one time it is possible to 
construct a static vulnerability profile that indicates whether the hazard exposure or the 
(in)ability to cope is the main determinant of vulnerability. Policies appropriate to the 
composite nature of the vulnerability can then be designed. However, to fully understand 
vulnerability it is not enough to simply take a one-period view – we also need to know what will 
happen in the next period. Vulnerability needs to be forward-looking, as it makes a prediction 
about future poverty (or other negative outcomes). Vulnerability does not simply refer to those 
who are likely to become poor in the future due to an unexpected shock, but also to those who 
will remain poor, those who will fall deeper into poverty and those who may fall into poverty 
due to predicable fluctuations, such as seasonality. This disaggregation is important as the 
policy responses are very different for these different groups and causes. 
 
An understanding of vulnerability is further complicated by the notion of „ability to manage.‟ 
Ability to manage shocks or hazards is a complex function of existing behaviour, reflected in 
livelihood profiles that themselves represent long-term or structural adaptation to predictable 
shocks; crisis response behaviour (such as the ability to rely on formal and informal insurance 
and networks in times of crisis), which is constrained by established livelihoods; and by 
external (policy) response to a predicted and actual crisis. 
 
Vulnerability is a broader concept than poverty in at least two ways: 
 
1. The non-poor are also vulnerable to future poverty (some definitions of vulnerability refer 
to people whose income is within, say, 20% of the poverty line). 
2. Vulnerability is a dynamic concept that is both forward-looking and constantly changing, 
while poverty is a static concept that measures proxies for wellbeing at a point in time. 
 
Policy implications of vulnerability are also broader than efforts to reduce poverty – although it 
is true that wealthier people tend to be less vulnerable, because they have more income and 
assets to buffer them against hazardous shocks and adverse processes. Policy interventions 
to manage vulnerability can either aim to reduce or spread risk (e.g. by supporting livelihood 
diversification), or to strengthen resilience (e.g. by introducing social insurance mechanisms 
such as weather insurance for farmers). In the absence or failure of these measures, public 
interventions need to deliver safety nets (e.g. food aid) and other forms of social protection 
(e.g. orphan carer grants) to those affected by shocks and processes that they are unable to 






Box 3 Reducing vulnerability through employment guarantees in India 
The most effective safety nets against disasters are those that are guaranteed to be 
activated when disaster strikes. Private insurance mechanisms are one option, but these are 
usually unaffordable and inaccessible to the rural poor. So the responsibility for providing 
social protection for the poorest falls on the state. In 2005, India passed into law the National 
Rural Employment Guarantee Act, which entitles every rural Indian household to 100 days of 
work at the minimum wage every year, or an unemployment allowance if work cannot be 
provided within two weeks of a request for employment. This is a unique demand-driven 
„right to work‟, which makes the NREGA a highly effective instrument in the fight against 
seasonal hunger and famine. Evidence from Maharashtra, which has run an Employment 
Guarantee Scheme (EGS) since the 1960s, confirms that the EGS has successfully 
prevented famines in drought years. 
Source: Devereux, Vaitla and Hauenstein Swan (2008) 
 
2.2 Vulnerability scenarios 
The above conceptualisation of vulnerability as having two distinct and dynamic dimensions 
can be illustrated in relation to the „vulnerability scenarios‟ presented below. 
 
Figure 2.2. Vulnerability scenarios for Malawi 
 Vulnerability Scenarios for Malawi
Fairly regular shock exposure, 
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increasing ability to manage risk
time
Declining shock exposure, 
decreasing ability to manage risk
time
Source: Sabates-Wheeler and Haddad (2005) 
 
The stylised scenarios in Figure 2.2 highlight a few possibilities of dynamic situations. The 
bottom left-hand quadrant illustrates a slow-onset crisis, where management of risk is 
gradually eroded in a context of regularly repeated shocks (for instance, chronic poverty and 
the run-down of assets in response to annual and cumulatively devastating hungry seasons). 
At the extreme left-hand side of the diagram we see that shocks and management ability are 
mutually exclusive. As we move to the right-hand side, shocks begin to erode the ability to 
manage, however, the latter dominates the former. Over time the shock increasingly interact 
with and erode ability to manage, to a point when the effects of the shock overwhelm ability to 
manage. The top left-hand quadrant highlights a situation where public and private actions 
combine to improve the ability to manage risk, despite continued exposure to shocks (e.g. 





The bottom right-hand quadrant describes a scenario where both exposure to shock and 
ability to manage are decreasing. This is a less intuitive scenario. An example may be a land-
grab from a recently widowed woman. This would be a major shock to the widow and her 
children, stripping the family of important productive assets and undermining their ability to 
manage future hazards and shocks. Even if they do not experience substantial future shocks, 
it is possible that their ability to manage will be further undermined by discriminatory social 
practices that alienate her from social networks, non-land assets and alternative possible 
livelihood opportunities. The top right-hand quadrant is a „best case‟ scenario – exposure to 
shock is reducing (e.g. by moving homes away from flood-prone areas) and ability to manage 
risk is increasing. 
 
Clearly the severity and frequency of shocks are crucial factors in determining the ability to 
manage. Many different scenarios are possible, depending on the nature and severity of 
hazards (a single devastating disaster such as an earthquake, a number of moderate shocks 
such as a sequence of poor harvests, or a persistent process such as falling farm sizes over 
many years); whether shocks are multiple and simultaneous, or individual and occasional; 
whether shocks are totally unexpected (such as a tsunami) or regular and predictable (such as 
the annual hungry season). But vulnerability not just a phenomenon that corresponds to 
shocks striking people at random, it is also socially constructed, being related to structural 
rigidities and inequalities that perpetuate disadvantage, exclusion and marginalisation of 
certain groups of people in the long-term. Certain types of vulnerabilities are established and 
reproduced through socio-cultural norms, various forms of discrimination, and differential 
access to political power. These factors are unlikely to present themselves as shocks, but 
rather as declining long-term trends in ability to manage. 
2.3 Vulnerability – poverty linkages 
Poor rural people‟s livelihoods are complex, diverse and risk-prone, with inherent seasonal 
instability. Vulnerability not only affects people‟s welfare, it also reduces growth, directly by 
destroying assets, and indirectly as the threat of shocks and stresses diverts assets from more 
productive activities to those that reduce vulnerability, and returns. 
 
It is intuitively obvious how risk (and the associated vulnerability) contributes to poverty. For 
instance, poor farmers in hazardous (e.g. drought- or flood-prone) environments tend to be 
risk averse, because their capacity to absorb economic losses is extremely low. So they 
respond to hazard, risk and uncertainty by adjusting their livelihood strategies, for instance by 
concentrating on low risk and diversified activities, and foregoing higher returns from 
specialisation, in order to reduce their exposure to hazards and vulnerability to stresses. 
Though entirely logical, this behaviour undermines investment and pro-poor growth. For 
example, farmers with insecure land tenure do not invest in land improvement; families from 
ethnic minorities with limited access to formal employment prefer to send their children to work 
rather than to school; and entrepreneurs without access to microfinance or insurance will not 
undertake potentially lucrative but risky activities. These responses to risk come at a high cost, 
in terms of reduced average returns and, therefore, the perpetuation of long-term poverty (see 
for example Dercon, 2002). 
 
It is less obvious how rural poverty contributes to risk and vulnerability, and the linkages are 
more difficult to establish empirically. This is because poverty (or an absence of wellbeing) 
reflects deficits across the full range of components that make up people‟s livelihoods. When 
„deficits‟ in wellbeing exist, in other words, when people live in poverty, livelihoods are 
undermined and the „ability to cope‟ largely defines their level of vulnerability. As discussed 
above, vulnerability is a function of resilience (itself a function of poverty status) and exposure 
to shock. Furthermore, poverty and exposure to shock interact such that poorer people and 
groups are often more likely to be exposed to hazards. This fact allows the identification of a 





Box 2.3 Vulnerability to floods, disease and poverty in Bangladesh 
There is a direct link from natural disasters to destitution, through loss of productive assets. 
There is also an indirect link, through the costs of addressing the health shocks that natural 
disasters often bring in their wake. So natural disasters, ill-health and poverty are 
interrelated. Floods and tsunamis, for instance, expose the poor to health risks associated 
with losses of shelter, clean water, sanitation facilities, firewood and fuel. Many diseases 
flourish after the floodwaters recede. In Bangladesh, the incidence of water-borne and other 
diseases such as cholera, diarrhoea, dysentery and measles are all higher than average in 
years of major flooding. The poor have fewest resources to protect themselves against these 
health risks. Nonetheless, the increase in spending on health costs after flood events in 
Bangladesh is highest among the poorest, and they spend a higher proportion of their 
income on health than do non-poor groups. This can divert scarce household resources from 
other basic needs, including food, and from investment in income-generating activities such 
as farming and micro-enterprises. 
Source: Sinha, Lipton and Yaqub (2002) 
 
First, there are spatial correlates between poverty and vulnerability: poor people tend to get 
pushed into marginal areas, where they struggle to make a living from tiny plots with degraded 
soils, on hill-slopes, or in areas vulnerable to monsoon flooding (e.g. in Bangladesh), volcanic 
eruptions and earthquakes (the 1975 earthquake in Guatemala City was memorably described as 
a „classquake‟ (Bankoff, at al., 2004)). Second, lack of productive resources not only traps poor 
people in poverty, it also raises their vulnerability – for example, smallholders who depend on 
rainfall face more variable harvests and greater risk of hunger and destitution than do farmers 
who have access to irrigation and drought-tolerant improved seeds. Third, in the labour 
market, poorer people are more likely to work in the informal sector where health and safety 
hazards are more prevalent, as the work environment is unlikely to meet minimum health and 
safety standards – and poor workers also have less power or voice to mobilise and demand 
that minimum standards are met. Finally, both poverty and vulnerability are related to levels of 
infrastructure –in China and India, vulnerability to famine declined rapidly as road and rail 
networks spread in the early twentieth century, but people living in sparsely populated regions 
of the Horn of Africa and the Sahel (not yet reached by transport and communications 
infrastructure) remain acutely vulnerable (Devereux, 2008). 
2.4 Assets, poverty and vulnerability 
Nothing exemplifies the complexity of the relationship between poverty and vulnerability than 
the role of assets in reducing poverty and protecting household vulnerability to shocks and 
hazards. According to Caroline Moser‟s „asset-vulnerability framework‟ (Moser 1998), 
households with more assets are less vulnerable, because their assets provide „buffers‟ 
against shocks. For instance, a rural family that owns many livestock can sell some animals to 
buy food if a drought devastates their harvest. The solution to reducing poverty and 
vulnerability, therefore, is to accumulate assets – not only physical assets like land and 
livestock, but also financial assets like savings, or „human capital‟ assets like marketable skills, 
or „social capital‟ assets like networks of influential friends. 
 
However, while the relationship between assets and poverty might seem straightforward 
enough, the relationship between assets and vulnerability is not always this simple. One 
complicating factor is „covariate risk‟. The same drought that destroys a family‟s field of crops 
can also kill their livestock, leaving them impoverished and highly vulnerable. This explains the 
paradox of why the people who produce food (farmers) are also the people who are most 
vulnerable to food crises – because rural sources of food and income are so interconnected, 
most livelihoods depend directly or indirectly on a single and unreliable input (rainfall). 
 
Secondly, shocks can affect the functioning of markets in ways that diminish the value of 




forced into selling assets to finance food purchases, the likely consequence is that food prices 
will be forced up (excess demand) while asset prices will be forced down (excess supply). 
Amartya Sen (1981) calls this „exchange entitlement decline‟, while Jeremy Swift writes about 
a „terms of trade price scissors‟ (Swift and Hamilton, 2001). During a food crisis in Malawi in 
2002, desperate rural families sold off their most valuable possessions – livestock, radios, 
furniture, kitchen utensils – at „distress prices‟ that averaged less than half their replacement 
cost. A bicycle was bartered for a bag of cassava; while one woman exchanged some of her 
clothes for a small plate of maize (Devereux and Tiba, 2007). This is commonly observed 
during food crises, and it is a polarising mechanism because it enables wealthy households to 
accumulate assets at undervalued prices. 
 
Thirdly, certain sources of vulnerability actually intensify as asset holdings increase. During 
civil conflicts, for instance, assets such as livestock and granaries are often targeted for 
confiscation or destruction by militia groups. In south Sudan, wealthy households have been 
systematically targeted by cattle rustlers and counter-insurgency groups since the 1980s, and 
their cattle herds have been decimated. Luka Deng labels this phenomenon „the curse of 
assets during civil war‟. Deng (2007: 250) found a “strong and significant positive correlation ... 
between famine mortality in 1998 and initial wealth”. Similar trends have been reported in 
other societies dominated by pastoralism or agro-pastoralism and characterised by civil 
insecurity or violent conflict, such as northern Uganda and parts of Kenya, Ethiopia and 
Somalia. In these circumstances, assets do not reduce vulnerability – quite the opposite. 
2.5 Conclusion 
Poverty and vulnerability reinforce each other. Everyone is vulnerable to food insecurity, social 
exclusion, natural disasters and other hazards, but the poor are more vulnerable because they 
are more exposed to these risks and are more likely to experience a larger and more 
prolonged (even irreversible) impact due to their limited (physical, financial, social and 
political) assets. Assets usually reduce both poverty and vulnerability to livelihood shocks. In 
some perverse cases assets can increase vulnerability, but these are unusual circumstances. 
The importance of voice and influence over people with power cannot be overstated; it is 
critical for determining whether poor people must attempt to cope with hazards on their own or 
can count on external assistance in times of stress. When such assistance is guaranteed – for 
instance, where predictable and social security systems provide effective safety nets against 




3. Influence of Rural-Urban Linkages on Extensive Rural Disaster Risk 
This section examines how the processes that link rural to urban and vice versa, either 
produce or reduce disaster risk for poor people living and originating from rural areas. In 
particular, the section looks at how the processes of migration and government 
decentralisation influence level of vulnerability and exposure to hazards. The section does not 
explicitly cover the wider literature on disaster impacts, for example on disaster-induced 
migration, unless this directly affects endogenous rural risk-poverty profiles over extended 
periods. 
3.1 Research on Rural-Urban Linkages 
While past approaches to development studies have tended to focus on either urban or rural 
spaces (Lynch 2005), rural-urban interactions are becoming the focus of an increasing 
numbers of researchers and are the subject of a number of volumes of development literature 
(e.g. see Tacoli 2006, Environment and Urbanisation Vol 10, 1 1998, STEPS Centre research 
programme). This reflects a shift in development paradigms to focus on flows and networks 
and signals a move away from characterising rural-urban linkages as only being inscribed by 
migration and its associated „push and pull‟ factors.  
 
Undoubtedly, rural and urban areas are closely linked - „rural areas have long been a source 
of food, raw materials, and labour for cities. So too, are cities places of opportunity for rural 
dwellers, providing markets for agricultural products, specialised services and sources of 
temporary employment and shelter‟ (id21 Insights 2002). While oversimplified, two-
dimensional and characterising cities and countryside as separate, Lynch‟s diagram of rural-
urban interactions show in figure 3.1 highlights the diversity of rural-urban and urban-rural flow 
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With the study of rural-urban processes as one of flows and networks being relatively recent, 
limited effort has been placed on assessing how rural-urban and urban-rural processes shape 
disaster risk (Smith 2004). For example, Tacoli‟s reader on Rural-Urban Linkages omits any 
mention of either risk or disasters, though it is legitimate to claim that these issues are handled 
implicitly through discussions of the livelihood transformations and the ecological footprints of 
different poor groups. Similarly Lynch‟s (2005) monograph Rural-Urban Interaction in the 
Developing World, limits discussion of disaster risk to how urban areas displace environmental 
burdens and therefore environmental risks, such as air pollution or water resource extraction, 
to surrounding peri-urban and rural areas. In this regard, Lynch notes that there is evidence to 
suggest agglomerating in urban centres offers added protection from flooding or drought as 
„social and political systems … provide the resources for reconstruction or establishment of 
preventative measures‟ (p.72). However, he also notes that gathering in urban areas 
generates other kinds of risks, such as the health risks associated with the transmission of 
infectious diseases. Issues relating to the production or reduction of extensive disaster risk in 
urban areas are dealt with by Satterthwaite et al. in their chapter on „urban poverty and 
extensive disaster risk‟ (ref. IIED chapter).    
 
The limited number of studies conducted on rural-urban interactions and disaster risk tend to 
focus on the production of risk in peri-urban areas, but more usually informal settlements on 
the fringes of large cities (e.g. Napier and Rubin 2002; Santosa 2002; Bustillos et al. 2002; 
UNDP 2004; Parker et al. 1995). These studies tend to focus on particular geographically 
bounded area rather than on how rural-urban processes produce risk themselves and 
dynamically shape these spaces.  
 
Rural-Urban Linkages and Disaster Risk 
Rural-urban interactions can be defined as „linkages across space (such as flows of people, 
goods, money, information and wastes) and linkages between sectors (for example between 
agriculture and services and manufacturing)‟ (IIED 2008).  
 
This section claims that extensive rural disaster risk is inherently a function of rural-urban 
interactions, particularly in rural hinterlands around urban centres and is specifically tied to the 
following development rural-urban development processes:  
 economic change (industrialisation, agricultural decline, changes in location of markets),  
 livelihoods change (leading to migration, increased commuting),  
 changes in the flow of goods and money (transport links, banking, investments) and  
 changes to spatial manifestation of political power (rights, access, changing distribution of 
government responsibilities).  
 
Cities themselves depend on the effective functioning and productivity of rural systems (Revi 
2007), and when either rural or urban areas are affected by disasters then there is an indirect 
effect on the other. Conversely, as detailed above, the existence and growth of cities 
significantly modifies the rural and peri-urban hinterland and the risks faced by people living 
there – through landfill sites, air and water pollution, mangrove destruction, watershed 
destabilisation and changing drainage patterns (UNDP 2004). Simply, cities generate rural 
extensive disaster risk through negatively impacting the environment around them. However, 
the picture is complicated by the fact that a growing city also creates opportunities for reducing 
or increasing the vulnerability of the rural poor by the way rural-urban processes shape 
livelihoods and poverty dynamics.  
 
Urban-Rural Markets 
For example, a growing city forges new markets and economic opportunities for rural food 
producers and service providers – potentially increasing rural household incomes and even 
lifting rural households out of poverty and reducing extensive risk (IFAD 2002, Rengasamy et 
al. 2003). This depends on the rural poor being able to access urban markets, given that they 




the way markets operate (price fluctuation, consumer preference) and may be excluded for 
social, political or cultural reasons (IIED 2008). Furthermore access to labour markets, as well 
as urban goods markets for example, is constantly changing as globalisation influences their 
operation, location and focus – this greatly affects how different groupings (gender, age, 
migrant status, ethnicity, wealth and location) benefit or become excluded from urban markets 
(IIED 2008).  
 
Additionally, urban areas commonly play a critical role in the livelihood strategies of the rural 
poor – low-income rural dwellers often rely on urban-based non-farm jobs and on remittances 
and other transfers from migrant relatives, whereas urban migrants rely on rural relatives to 
support the household (IIED 2008). Income from migration is therefore part of a rural 
household‟s livelihood diversification strategy (UNDP 2004), one that spreads livelihood and 
income risk (Tacoli 2003), and may help to reduce disaster risk (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2008). 
As UNDP (2004, 66) note, „in Haiti, less than 30 percent of income in rural areas is derived 
from agriculture, instead rural dwellers depend on complex livelihood strategies, including 
seasonal migration or inputs from remittances sent from relatives in cities or overseas‟.  
 
Furthermore, Revi (2007) points to increasing conflict over water extraction and rights, as 
cities are drawing their water from rural areas, where water is already in short supply and also 
discharging its pollution in the same areas – thus decreasing poor rural dwellers access to 
clean water and increasing extensive disaster risk.    
3.2 Migration 
Evidence tends to suggest that disasters themselves accelerate rural-urban migration and 
then subsequently, poor rural to urban migrants are subjected to disproportionate disaster risk 
as they live in exposed locations and have limited access to livelihood assets and 
infrastructure (DFID 2004). „The functioning of land and property markets and inability of land-
use planning to cope with rapid population growth means migrants frequently locate in hazard-
prone locations. For example, in peripheral squatter settlements located in ravines, on 
unstable slopes or in flood-prone areas, or else in dense inner city slums‟ (UNDP 2004, 60). 
With agrarian systems increasingly under threat due to climate change, rurally-focused 
disasters and shifting markets, rural-urban migration is likely to increase even in the areas 
where it has been reasonably limited (Revi 2007). However, as detailed below, migration, 
being the most visible form of rural-urban interaction comprises sets of complex processes 
and considerations that can either produce or reduce extensive disaster risk.  
 
Migration as an adaptive livelihood strategy 
Migration is a livelihood strategy of poor people and a way that people may choose to adapt to 
degraded or risky rural environments (Siddiqui 2003), meaning depopulation of rural areas in 
favour of alternative locations may reduce extensive rural disaster risk and reduce rural 
poverty (Sabates-Wheeler et al. 2008). The link between migration and environmental 
degradation and perceived disaster risk is increasing being drawn (Gemenne et al. 2006), with 
migration being the result of cumulative increases in environmental stress, possibly related to 
climate change, as much as single disaster events. However, the linkage between 
environmental stresses or disruption and migration is rarely direct and can be difficult to 
identify its significance among a range of complex socio-economic factors (Gemenne et al. 
2006). In this context, migration is a coping strategy, a routine livelihood mechanism to cope 
with scarcity and stress, and a mechanism that can reduce extensive disaster risk. More and 
more, migration is being discussed as an anticipatory adaptation to climate change, possibly 
incentivised or assisted in some way through social protection measures, given knowledge 
that rural communities are unsustainable over extended time periods in certain bio-regions 
(Davies and Leavy 2007).  
 
In addition to the likely hazard exposure of recipient communities, it is also important to 




risky, the migrant may lack access to key livelihood assets in the host community and 
employment conditions are often unregulated (Rafique et al. 2006). The further a poor rural 
migrant has to travel from their family, the less likely they are to be supported by rural-urban 
food transfers tied to land ownership and reciprocity exchanges (Mougeot 2005). Furthermore, 
migrants themselves are not the poorest or most vulnerable rural dwellers. For example, in the 
seven countries of Central America, about half the population now lives in urban areas, though 
most of the poor still live in rural areas; and rural people are twice as likely to be poor as urban 
dwellers. Migration from rural areas has made a big contribution to rural poverty reduction, up 
to 75% of the latter by some estimates‟ (ODI 2003). However, the people now living in rural 
areas are disproportionately likely to be poorly educated, live in large families, belong to 
minority group and vulnerable to rural violence and disasters (ODI 2003) – they have low 
mobility as their ability to migrate may well be hampered by illiteracy, disability and their 
ethnicity.    
 
Social Relations 
Much has been written about the value of enhancing and protecting social capital (friendships, 
kinships, patron-client relationships etc.) as a way of reducing disaster risk (FAO 2003; UNDP 
2004), but much less on how migration affects social capital. UNDP, 2004 discusses how 
migrants are often excluded from participatory decision-making processes in their host 
communities, though Schneider (1999) points out that few migrants move to cities alone, 
retaining some form of social network with the people they are migrating with – whether 
friends, family or people from the same area as them. However, Schneider‟s research in 
Thailand and the Philippines tends to suggest that more and more migrants are moving alone, 
either temporarily or permanently, and leaving their families behind due to increasing 
livelihood pressures on households. This trend is also supported by evidence from India 
(Mitchell et al. 2007), where there has been a rapid increase in the number of female-headed 
households, as men migrate to cities in search of employment. This trend points to the erosion 
of social networks in both the host and feeder communities as individuals become dislocated – 
indirectly increasing extensive disaster risk.  
 
Remittances  
Some work has looked at the role of remittances from migrants and diasporas for financing 
disaster relief, such as in the Pakistan earthquake and Hurricane Mitch (Suleri and Savage 
2006; Kidder ?; Clarke and Wallsten 2003); but less has focused on the role remittances play 
in allowing recipients to invest in actions that reduce disaster risk (Suleri and Savage 2006; 
Wamsler 2007). Suleri and Savage (2006, 21) suggest that strengthening and promoting 
remittance flows should be a priority for DRR. „Remittances are an important way of reducing 
risk from local disasters, and also provide an insurance mechanism that can, to a limited 
extent, cover losses‟. In their study they found that households living in exposed regions, 
when receiving remittances, made sensible, risk reducing investment decisions, such as 
stronger housing. Remittances may be invested in more diverse rural livelihoods, reducing 
extensive disaster risk. Woo (2006) even mentioned the possibility of taxing remittances at 1% 
to help pay for DRR programming. 
 
Urban-rural post disaster migration 
In the post-Hurricane Katrina period, increasing attention is being given to the production of 
rural extensive disaster risk following urban disasters or linked to urban evacuations (Meit et 
al. 2007), a trend that is likely to continue given the increasing number of urban dwellers 
exposed to climate change-induced disasters. Meit et al. (ibid) observe that rural infrastructure 
cannot cope with the pressures of urban evacuees on sanitation, food, water and fuel 
resources, and cannot provide enough permanent or temporary livelihood opportunities to 
sustain large influxes of people. These urban-rural population shifts, however temporary, are 
likely to elevate extensive rural disaster risk because the short-term pressure on resources, 
particularly on ecosystem services, may be enduring after the majority of the temporary 




pressures, Meit et al. call for rural planners, particularly rural disaster managers, to be 
involved in urban DRR and preparedness.  
  
Migration to small towns 
Atkinson (2000) finds evidence that the majority of recent rural-to-urban migration in the 
Philippines is to the smaller towns and regional centres rather than the bigger cities and that 
wider migration patterns are characterised by step-wise (village-town-city) or cyclical 
processes (seasonable variations in labour demands) (Lynch 2005). This has implications for 
disaster risk management (DRM) and extensive disaster risk, as greatly swelling towns are 
less likely to have the DRM experience or the social and political resources of large cities to 
protect even some of its citizens. 
3.3 Decentralisation and Rural Local Government 
Multi-lateral and bilateral donors have been actively supporting fiscal, administrative and 
political decentralisation for over two decades, transferring responsibility from urban centres of 
power to local governments in rural areas. The rationale for decentralisation is that local 
governments can relate to local needs more sympathetically and accurately (Faquet 2002), 
deliver public services in a more targeted manner (Litvack and Seddon 1999) and reducing 
corruption through improved accountability (Fisman and Gatti 2002). Similarly, 
decentralisation of responsibility for managing disaster risk to local governments has been 
advocated for by a number of authors and institutions (e.g. Twigg 2007; ISDR 2007). The 
rationale for this is based on similar reasons as those given above; but as yet, there has been 
little critical evaluation of the link between decentralised disaster risk management and its 
impact on disaster risk.  
 
More widely, proponents of decentralisation claim that it can have a considerable impact on 
reducing rural poverty and thereby greatly decreasing extensive disaster risk (e.g. ADB, 
UNDP, CIFOR, World Bank). While the picture is extremely mixed, a major evaluation of 
decentralisation of democratic responsibility conducted by the OECD (2004) found that 
decentralisation generated little discernable impact on levels of poverty. This view is backed 
by Crook (2003), who found that decentralisation delinked from wider processes is likely to be 
unsuccessful in tackling poverty. Jűtting et al. (2004) studied the impact of decentralisation on 
rural poverty in 19 countries, finding that it varies distinctly between countries depending on 
their rate of economic growth. They also found that „where the state lacks the capacity to fulfil 
its basic functions, there is a definite risk that decentralisation will increase poverty rather than 
reduce it‟ (2004, 5). Conversely they found that where central governments were committed to 
the process, decentralisation increased the participation of different poor groups and 
enhanced the targeting of service provision.  
 
OECD (2004) suggest that decentralisation must be accompanied by capacity building and 
matching resources, and should seek to support local civil society organisations at the same 
time, because stronger civil society through accountability pathways, promotes more effective 
local government.  
 
Governance of Rural-Urban Linkages 
Local governments tend to divide rural and urban responsibilities and national governments 
rarely directly address urban-rural linkages (IIED 2008). This is despite countries being 
increasingly concerned about striking a balance between populations and resource pressures 
in rural and urban areas by instituting large scale rural development plans.  
 
This is important for a number of reasons. Hodder (2000, 80-82) argues that there is a close 
link between urban industrial growth and a thriving rural agriculture sector. This is because:  
- agriculture depends on manufactured good to transform production (e.g. farm tools, 




- more technologically advance agriculture reduces labour inputs, providing labour 
forces for urban industrial sector.  
- agriculture provides raw material for manufacturing – e.g. sisal and cotton. 
 
Furthermore, it is important to strike a balance between income, prices and taxation between 
rural and urban areas, so as to provide incentives for rural farmers but not to increase prices 
too much for urban consumers. Additionally, ensuring food security in rapidly urbanising 
regions is dependent on effective agricultural production, which is threatened if there is an 
ever decreasing rural labour force.    
 
Effective local government in managing rural-urban relationships is vital. Local government 
plays a crucial role in determining access to natural resources for poor people, through their 
support of certain land tenure systems, their prioritisation of different users and in developing 
regulatory frameworks. Tacoli (2004) describes an effective local government as accountable 
with adequate resources and strong capacity, as able to identify and respond to local needs 
and priorities, as supporting forward and backward linkages between agriculture and services 
and industry located in local urban centres and as able to regulate local natural resource 
management. Conversely ineffective local government is unaccountable, has inadequate 
resources and capacity and is not integrated with national planning (Tacoli 2004).  
 
DRR and Transfer of Responsibility to Rural Local Government 
As DFID‟s DRR Policy (2006, 12) observes: 
 ‘work to define institutional and legal mechanisms for DRR in many developing countries, 
including the Maldives, Sri Lanka and Pakistan, has shown a clear trend towards empowering 
local governments. Local governments and communities are the first line of response in any 
emergency: disaster risk reduction can therefore be a strong incentive for decentralisation. 
Local government also plays a crucial role in facilitating bottom-up planning and empowering 
local communities through knowledge transfer. The challenge is to match this with a 
delegation of resources, as well as to better understand and mitigate the potential for 
corruption at local level, for example in the enforcement of building codes and land-use 
planning permission’. 
 
Twigg (2007) agrees, arguing that „devolution of responsibility (and resources) for DRR 
planning and implementation to local government levels and communities, as far as possible, 
backed up by provision of specialist expertise and resources to support local decision-making, 
planning and management of disasters‟ is part of the enabling environment which helps to 
foster disaster resilient communities. However, he also highlights that to be effective, local 
governments must recognise the rights to safety, participation and equitable vulnerability 
reduction of all sections of society. Additionally, in calling for DRR to be mainstreamed into 
National Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPS), UN-ISDR (2007) advocates for PRSPs 
to „decentralize, empower and allow fiscal autonomy to address risk at the local government 
level; for example enact laws to ensure security of land right as incentives for risk-reducing 
investments‟.  
 
In many poor rural areas, local governments may be unable to provide the services needed 
that help to reduce extensive disaster risk, either because of the reduction in central 
government public investment or because it fails to generate sufficient revenue at the local 
level. And whilst local decision making, supported by adequate resources, can support 
positive rural–urban linkages, wider issues such as land tenure systems, institutional 
structures of markets and broader national development strategies are likely to affect local 
initiative. Better integration of local development and disaster risk management strategies in 
national planning is therefore crucial. Finally, especially in nations where decentralization is 
relatively recent, substantial efforts are necessary to ensure the legitimacy and the capacity of 





Again, as with the findings of the OECD evaluation (2004), effective decentralisation of 
disaster risk management responsibilities will also require parallel support to local civil society 
as well. In some cases, these local NGOs may populate a risk management void where rural 
local governments are ineffective at tackling disaster risk and will help to hold them to account 
on their national and international commitments. Much anecdotal evidence suggests that local 
governments in poor rural areas are particularly ill equipped to reduce disaster risk, lacking 
resources, skills and knowledge and simply do not see DRR as a priority over land acquisition 
and transfer and tackling rural poverty.  
 
As UNDP (2004, 89) suggest „there is a need for institutional systems and administrative 
arrangements that link public, private and civil society sectors [associated with DRR] and build 
vertical ties between local, district, national and global scale actors‟. However, the question 
remains as to whether it is more effective to concentrate disaster risk management expertise 
and service delivery in particular centres of excellence or should responsibility be 
decentralised to local government. Ideally, strength at all scales is desirable, but often not 
realistic given resource constraints and a lack of political will.  
3.4 Conclusion 
This section highlights that migration is a complex process that has both positive and negative 
impacts on the levels of extensive disaster risk, that households are increasingly becoming 
multi-spatial, with members living in a number of different urban and rural locations and 
deriving income from diverse livelihoods. Migrants from rural to urban areas need to be 
specifically targeted by disaster risk management programmes as they lack social networks, 
are excluded from host communities and lack access to infrastructure and basic assets – they 
also tend to locate in the most hazard prone locations. Additionally, the households and 
communities they have left should not be forgotten and must be targeted for risk reduction 
programmes that link rural to urban. These programmes must recognise the role of 
remittances and potential increases in household income as well as the likely greater 
prevalence of female-headed households and the specific considerations these require.  
 
The existence and growth of urban areas themselves generates extensive rural disaster risk, 
and this is likely to accelerate given the pressures of climate change on agrarian systems, 
which will force more people into urban or peri-urban environments. Conventional DRM 
focuses either on urban areas or rural communities, but, due to increased integration or urban 
and rural, risks embedded in cities are also embedded in the countryside and vice versa (Revi 
2007). Integrated rural-urban risk management programmes must take into account these 
linkages, the co-production of risk and different sectoral investments and regional processes.   
 
While decentralisation of poverty reduction and DRM has benefits in participation and 
recognition of local needs, many local governments in rural areas are ill-equipped to promote 
rural development or to tackle disaster risk as they lack skills and resources. There is very 
limited evidence to suggest that decentralisation either reduces poverty or enhances effective 
disaster risk management. To improve this, local government DRM must be integrated within 
national or regional risk management frameworks and development programmes and 
municipal disaster management must include the governments/people in the surrounding peri-
urban and rural hinterlands. Further, decentralisation of disaster risk management and poverty 
reduction responsibilities to rural local governments must be accompanied by a transfer of 
capacity and resources, along with parallel support to civil society organisations who are well 
placed to hold local governments to account and to fill voids should government fail.  
 
 
4. Climate Change: Threat and Opportunity for Rural Poverty 
This section examines potential threats and opportunities posed by climate change for poor 
people in rural areas. 
4.1 Impacts of climate change on rural populations 
Global climate change is receiving unprecedented attention in the international community, 
and linkages between climate change and poverty have gathered pace since the turn of the 
millennium (AfDB et al, 2003; Adger et al, 2003; UNDP, 2007; Tanner and Mitchell, 2008). 
There is now overwhelming evidence that the global climate is changing and strong evidence 
to suggest that human-cause emissions of greenhouse gases into the atmosphere are largely 
to blame (IPCC, 2007). While these will continue drive gradual shifts in average temperature, 
rainfall and sea-level, they also have significant implications for the distribution, frequency and 
intensity of extreme weather events that can cause disasters. This has implications in the 
short term for the ability of communities to absorb or adjust to extreme events, and may 
threaten the productive base of society, particularly in natural resource dependent economies 
in the longer-term (Parry and Carter, 1985). 
 
The trend for hydro-meteorological disaster events is rising, and the recent 4th Assessment 
Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) concludes that:  
“The type, frequency and intensity of extreme events are expected to change as 
Earth‟s climate changes, and these changes could occur even with relatively small 
mean climate changes. Changes in some types of extreme events have already been 
observed, for example, increases in the frequency and intensity of heat waves and 
heavy precipitation events.” (Meehl et al, 2007:783).  
 
Some of the major projected impacts of changes in extreme weather and climate events are 
outlined in Table 4.1a.  
 
These impacts of climate change are not evenly distributed, in part due to the differentiated 
nature of hazards in different parts of the globe, but also due to differences in the ecological 
and socio-economic environment, which mediate these hazards and determine the severity of 
impacts. As outlined in Section 2, vulnerability is determined both by exposure to the climate-
related hazards, and by ability to manage the risks.  
 
Generally, poor groups in developed countries are likely to be hardest hit by the effects of 
climate change, and the rural poor are particularly vulnerable (UNDP, 2007). Poor and rural 
populations tend to rely more heavily on climate-sensitive sectors such as agriculture and 
fisheries, meaning that variations in climate have a highly tangible and often immediate impact 
on livelihoods and well-being. This is compounded for poorer citizens as they tend to be 
located geographically in marginal areas that are more exposed to climatic hazards, such as 
flood plains, drylands, mountains, or on nutrient-poor soils (Mitchell and Tanner, 2006).  
 
The multiple dimensions of poverty constrain the ability of rural populations to respond to the 
impacts of climatic variations due to limited human, institutional and financial capacity. 
Aspects of poverty related to rural livelihoods outlined in previous sections are therefore 
important determinants of adaptive capacity, or “the potential, capability, or ability of a system 
to adapt to climate change stimuli or their effects or impacts” (Smit et al, 2001:894). Broader 
determinants of this capacity include technology, information and skills, infrastructure, 
institutions, and equity. Lower adaptive capacity combined with a greater hazard burden will 
be particularly problematic in the least developing countries (LDC) and low-lying small island 
developing states (SIDS).  
 
Table 4.1a: Examples of possible impacts of climate change due to changes in extreme 






For the rural economy, water and agriculture are two of the most critical sectors, particularly in 
areas of rainfed agriculture, and where assets and investment are low, markets are poorly 
developed, and communities do not have adequate formal or informal social protection 
mechanisms. While climate change impacts will vary geographically and over time, some 
examples of projected changes on water and agriculture at a continental scale are presented 





Table 4.1b: Examples of projected climate change impacts in Africa, Asia and Latin America 
Latin America (from IPCC, 2007. All statements are made with very high confidence or high 
confidence.) 
 
Africa o By 2020, between 75 and 250 million of people are projected to be exposed to 
increased water stress due to climate change.  
o By 2020, in some countries, yields from rain-fed agriculture could be reduced by up to 
50%. Agricultural production, including access to food, in many African countries is 
projected to be severely compromised. This would further adversely affect food 
security and exacerbate malnutrition. 
Asia o By the 2050s, freshwater availability in Central, South, East and South-East Asia, 
particularly in large river basins, is projected to decrease.  
o Coastal areas, especially heavily populated megadelta regions in South, East and 
South-East Asia, will be at greatest risk due to increased flooding from the sea and, in 
some megadeltas, flooding from the rivers. 
Latin 
America 
o By mid-century, increases in temperature and associated decreases in soil water are 
projected to lead to gradual replacement of tropical forest by savanna in eastern 
Amazonia. Semi-arid vegetation will tend to be replaced by arid-land vegetation. 
o Productivity of some important crops is projected to decrease and livestock 
productivity to decline, with adverse consequences for food security. In temperate 
zones, soybean yields are projected to increase. 
o Changes in precipitation patterns and the disappearance of glaciers are projected to 
significantly affect water availability for human consumption, agriculture and energy 
generation. 
 
4.2 Reducing climate change risks: Disaster risk reduction and adaptation  
These projected impacts of climate change will be overlaid onto existing patterns of climate-
related hazards and the natural variability of the climate, and are in turn part of a much wider 
range of hazards affecting rural livelihoods such as seasonality and HIV/AIDS (see Section 2). 
In the face of these challenges, a growing body of work and international implementation has 
formed around adapting systems to prepare for and respond to climate change. This process 
is known as adaptation, defined by the IPCC as: 
 „Adjustment in natural or human systems in response to actual or expected climatic 
stimuli or their effects, which moderates harm or exploits beneficial opportunities‟ 
(McCarthy et al, 2001).  
 
Top-down approaches to adaptation have largely been based on modelling to ascertain future 
climate changes and secondary impacts (e.g. for crops or water availability) (McCarthy et al, 
2001). Results can be applied to wide areas and provide quantified estimates for decision-
makers, but such approaches are complicated by the inherent uncertainty of predictions and 
tend to favour technical analysis and adaptation options rather than socio-political factors 
affecting vulnerability (Klein et al 2007). In contrast, a more poverty-centred approach has 
been pursued by the development community which regards coping strategies for existing 
climatic variations as the first stage in building in adaptation to future changes (Burton and van 
Aalst, 2004). This more dynamic approach draws on field assessments of existing vulnerability 
and coping mechanisms and is more likely to identify the underlying causes of vulnerability, 
including structural factors that can cause and entrench poverty, such as access to natural 
resources or services, insecurity, poor governance or an absence of markets (Mitchell and 





This latter approach inextricably links adaptation with development processes, calling attention 
to the needs of the global poor on the basis of equity and justice. However, poverty-adaptation 
linkages have to date focused largely on the aggregate level, highlighting vulnerable nations 
or regions, in part due to the scales of debate internationally. More recently, there has been 
increased interest in differentiating adaptation needs for different livelihood strategy and 
poverty characteristics (Tanner and Mitchell, 2008a).  
 
Adaptation thereby encapsulates a wide variety of related development activities that 
moderate harm from climatic impacts and effects, and to take advantage of potential benefits. 
Adaptation activities can usefully be viewed in the context of a continuum of adaptation 
activities (McGray et al, 2007), some of which are based on broader processes reducing 
vulnerability to a wide range of shocks and stresses, such as education and health 
programmes. Others activities may provide the enabling environment and response capacity 
through which climate-focused adaptation processes can occur, but again build the ability to 
adapt to multiple aspects of a changing environment. These include building effective planning 
systems or improved natural resource management.  Adaptation may also relate more to 
specific climate impacts, incorporating climate information into decision making including 
through disaster management plans, changing crop-types or improving infrastructure 
resilience. At the extreme, there are actions that almost exclusively confront the new 
challenges of climate change, such as glacial melting, sea-level rise, or coral bleaching. A 
variety of examples of such activities in rural areas are shown in figure 4.1.  
 




Disaster risk reduction (DRR) is increasingly contributing to adaptation as the disaster 
management debate moves beyond core humanitarian actions of emergency response, relief 
and reconstruction towards prevention, preparedness and mitigation of disaster events 
(UN/ISDR, 2004). As figure 4.1 demonstrates, DRR activities focused on extreme events have 
a key role in contributing to adaptation. Nevertheless, these widespread overlaps at the 
practical level masked by poor interaction and institutional overlap among the communities of 
practice around disasters, climate change and development (Sperling and Szekely, 2005; 





The structural conditions underlying poverty and vulnerability are also likely to constrain 
opportunities for climate adaptation, but it is increasingly acknowledged that as well as 
generating potentially increased risks, climate change may also lead to more favourable 
circumstances which can provide opportunities for poverty reduction (Kates, 2000; Tanner and 
Mitchell, 2008a). These include potentially beneficial agricultural conditions through higher 
temperatures, increased atmospheric fertilisation rates, and more favourable rainfall. The 
processes of facilitating adaptation may also generate enhanced opportunities for livelihood 
enhancement, as demonstrated in the Vietnam case study in Box 4.2. Enabling poor people in 
rural areas to take advantage of these opportunities is crucial as a counter measure to offset 
detrimental impacts, especially as recent research suggests that the impacts of such gradual 
changes on production will be outweighed by the increasing frequency of crop loss due to 
extreme events, such as droughts and heavy precipitation (Easterling et al, 2007).  
 
Box 4.2. DRR and Adaptation in coastal Vietnam  
An environmental preservation project conducted by the Vietnam Red Cross addressed two issues 
affecting the people living on the coast in Thai Thuy district of Thai Binh province. With eight to ten 
typhoon storms striking the coast of Vietnam annually, tidal flooding often breaches sea dykes and 
causes economic losses to the local population engaged in aquaculture. With climate change, the 
intensity of these storms is likely to increase and the breaches become more serious. The Red Cross 
project involved creating 2,000 hectares of mangrove plantations, which serve two important 
purposes. Firstly, the trees act as a buffer zone in front of the dykes, reducing the water velocity, 
wave strength and wind energy. This helps protect coastal land, human life and assets invested in 
development. Secondly, the new mangroves contribute to the production of valuable exports such as 
shrimp and crabs, high-value species of marine fish, mollusc farming, and the culture of seaweed for 
agar and alginate extraction. This offers new employment opportunities to help what was a vulnerable 
population improve their livelihoods. 
Source: IFRC-RCS, 2002 
 
4.3 Limiting climate change: Mitigation and rural poverty  
There are also risks and opportunities for rural poverty presented by the efforts to slow and/or 
reduce the negative effects of climate change by slowing the further build up of greenhouse 
gases in the atmosphere, a process known in the climate change community as mitigation. 
Agriculture and forestry sectors have played a major role in contributing to the emission of 
anthropogenic greenhouse gases, constituting over 30% of total anthropogenic GHG 
emissions in 2004 (IPCC, 2007). These sectors will therefore be crucial for the future 
mitigation of climate change, with resultant risks and opportunities for rural poverty.  
 
Mitigation policies and measures that have significant impacts on rural areas include 
emissions trading projects under the formal Clean Development Mechanism and informal 
markets, the production of biofuels, and the emerging role of Reduced Emissions from 
Deforestation and Degradation (REDD) within the international climate change negotiations. 
While these instruments are likely to generate additional flows of finance and investment, they 
are also all likely to enhance demands for scarce assets in rural areas, particularly land and 
water. Ensuring that national mitigation activities do not conflict with food security and rural 
poverty reduction is therefore one of the most pressing agendas of the climate change and 
development nexus. The need to boost agriculture production and maintain a balance 
between biofuel and food production has become a pressing need in the context of soaring 
global food prices (FAO, 2008).  
 
Climate change policies will also have implications for access to energy by the rural poor. At a 
basic level, this may involve ensuring the sustainability of fuelwood supplies, and gradual 
replacement with fuel sources that are less destructive to the local and global environment. 
Potentially, climate change policies can encourage more widespread shifts from large grid-




help improve access and enhance adaptive capacity and poverty reduction (Venema and 
Cisse, 2004). Such shifts are likely to depend on strong market signals from climate change 
regulation at international and national level, as well as international flows of finance and 
technology.  
 
The joint challenges of mitigation and adaptation in the rural context are highlighted by the 
case study from Senegal in Box 4.1. This shows how adaptation and mitigation can be 
usefully combined in a way that enhances incomes and diversifies livelihoods of the poor, 
while also securing benefits for biodiversity, gender equality and carbon sequestration.  
 
Box 4.3. Adaptation and Mitigation Through 'Produced Environments': The Case for Agriculture 
Intensification in Senegal 
A pilot farm in Niayes, Senegal, launched in the 1970s, has evolved over time to address significant 
variations in climate change. The Sébikotane programme has had to adapt to successive droughts, a 
drying climate and a growing population increasingly gravitating to urban centres. Planting dense 
perennial hedges that act as windbreakers helps to generate an agriculturally conducive microclimate. 
Traditional predominantly rain-fed forms of agriculture have been replaced by irrigation-based 
commercial crops. The windbreakers fight wind-related soil erosion and desiccation of crops, which had 
not previously been addressed. They also provide valuable fuelwood for cooking, lessening the burden 
on girls and women to collect wood. The use of windbreaks to 'produce the environment' has led to 
increased production of fruit and vegetables for commercial sale in domestic and high-value export 
markets as well as demonstrated carbon sequestration benefits. It also provides employment for young 
people and has helped train a new generation of farmers. The innovations and adaptation practises 
used in Sébikotane have been taken up nationally and supported internationally as being relevant to 
other sub-Saharan countries, as they illustrate an innovative, integrated way of managing the 
environment to provide adaptation and mitigation benefits locally as well as globally.  
Source: Seck et al 2005.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The impacts of climate change on rural livelihoods will be overlaid onto existing variability in 
the climate and the multiple shocks and stresses faced by rural communities. Rural poverty 
will also face both potentially positive and negative impacts from efforts to mitigate the climate 
change problem. While climate change is commonly presented as a gradual shift in climatic 
trends, its impacts will be most strongly felt by poor rural communities through changes in the 
distribution, nature and magnitude of extreme weather events.  
There is consequently an emerging debate around poverty and climate change based on 
applying a social justice and equity lens to consider how adaptation and mitigation can be 
„pro-poor‟ in reducing relative levels of absolute poverty and vulnerability. Simply, the poor 
must suffer less from climate change than the rich. This raises questions about how 
addressing climate change might involve the redistribution of assets and enable genuine 
reverses in inequality.  
 
Adapting to these changes will require bolstering DRR as a first line of defence, including 
disaster prevention as well as response. However, it will also require actions to reduce 
vulnerability to the wider set of structural conditions underlying vulnerability in rural areas in 
addition to those targeted specifically at the impacts of climate change.  At the same time, 
poor rural populations must be given greater attention in efforts to tackle mitigation. This 
includes both safeguarding that their livelihoods are not threatened by actions such as 
biofuels, forestry or renewable energy development, and in ensuring that these actions can 













5. Approaches to co-managing rural poverty and disaster risks 
This section sets out different approaches to managing rural poverty alongside disaster risk, 
focusing on measures that can help reduce vulnerability to both. First poverty impacts of 
disasters are outlined, followed by short case studies of measures used to co-manage rural 
poverty and disaster risk including a detailed exploration of the scope of social protection for 
dealing with poverty impacts of disasters. The section concludes with a discussion of how we 
can ensure national, sustainable and holistic approaches in the co-management of poverty 
and disaster risk through linking social protection with DRR. 
 
5.1. Poverty impacts of disasters 
The increasing threat of disasters are changing and deepening the risks already faced by poor 
and vulnerable people in rural areas. This has profound implications for the security of their 
livelihoods and for their welfare.  There are clear overlaps between poverty and disaster risk, 
with poverty reduction policy/ planning and disasters each potentially impacting on the other. 
As discussed in section 2, and again in section 4 in relation to climate change, hazard impacts 
at microeconomic (household livelihoods and human development) and macroeconomic levels 
– with both short term and longer-term effects on economic growth, development and poverty 
reduction - can increase risk and susceptibility to further disaster risk, exacerbating and 
creating poverty, and undermining overall efforts to meet the Millennium Development Goals 
(see, for example, the study of economic and financial consequences of „natural‟ hazards by 
Benson and Clay, 2004). 
 
Poorer households are typically less equipped to deal with shocks and disasters, and informal 
insurance arrangements are likely to be seriously limited especially for shocks that are 
covariate among all members of formal or informal insurance networks. National-level 
statistics of numbers below poverty thresholds following a disaster suggest that the number of 
people in poverty increases. For example, Ecuador experienced an increase in poverty 
headcount from 34 percent in 1995 to 46 percent in 1998, due to the effects of El Niño in 
1997-1998 on the climate, combined with an oil shock. Hurricane Mitch in October 1998 
caused widespread losses of agricultural output in Honduras; the overall poverty rate 
increased from 43 to 46 percent, with rural households experiencing greater poverty impacts 
(IMF, 2003:66). 
 
Coping strategies in response to shocks in agriculture/ rural areas tend to fall under the 
following areas: 
 
1. reducing consumption 
2. working longer hours 
3. running down savings 
4. external support, NGO, gvt etc 
5. loan default 
6. crop/ livelihood diversification 
7. sale of assets 
8. taking loans 
9. cutting down on input use 
 
Development failures may increase peoples‟ exposure and vulnerability to natural hazards and 
disasters, creating risk through reducing the effectiveness of established coping mechanisms 
and by generating new hazards. In some cases, actual responses to disasters and attempts to 
reduce risk, when poorly planned, can lead to new hazards and vulnerabilities. A three-stage 
process of collapse in coping strategies, as assets are eroded by subsequent disaster 
impacts, has been suggested by Adger (1996). In the first stage people offset disaster effects 




In the second stage, households are subsequently forced to sell key productive assets (land 
and housing rights, livestock, machinery) to survive. In the final stage the household is forced 
to disband, with people joining other households, embarking on distress migration or 
becoming destitute. 
 
Poor households forced to sell their productive assets, such as draft animals, may never be 
able to replenish their stocks. This can see them remaining in poverty permanently, or for 
many years after the shock, and can have a „poverty ratchet effect‟ as coping strategies 
become exhausted both at an individual and community level. People may have to turn to 
other less productive livelihood strategies, or even become destitute, making recovery from 
the shock difficult (discussed also in section 1.3). Strategies such as reducing investment in 
child health and education may transmit poverty from current to future generations. When 
hazards are frequent and affect whole communities they can turn into chronic crises where 
effects of disasters can seem permanent (see, for example, Sharp et al. 2003 on chronic food 
insecurity in Ethiopia).  
 
There are, therefore, potential gains in incorporating DRR into poverty reduction policy, and 
vice-versa. For example, asset enhancement, income generating and livelihood diversification 
programmes have the potential to provide immediate and effective relief to households 
affected by the disaster while at the same time contributing to poverty alleviation in the long 
run. The following section sets out case studies of poverty reduction and disaster risk 
management. 
5.2. Case studies of co-managing poverty reduction and disaster risk 
Projects and programmes with poverty and disaster risk overlaps either tackle poverty 
reduction post disaster impact or address poverty reduction with DRR. This section focuses on 
the latter – examples of co-managing poverty reduction and disaster risk. 
 
Projects, programmes and policies that co-manage poverty reduction with disaster risk 
encompass: i) livelihoods and asset-based approaches; ii) local/„traditional‟ coping strategies; 
iii) community-based approaches to managing common property and other resources; iv) 
conservation approaches; v) local and national government policy formulation and 
implementation; vi) DRR approaches including early warning systems; and vii) social 
protection. The section first describes briefly initiatives that fall under the umbrella of the first 
six categories listed above, before focusing on social protection measures in combination with 
DRR. The potential of such an approach to co-managing successfully poverty reduction and 
disaster risk is demonstrated through case studies on weather-indexed crop insurance, cash 
transfers, and starter packs and seed fairs. 
 
Livelihoods and Asset-Based Approaches 
Livelihoods approaches to poverty reduction and DRR focus on developing „capitals‟ – human, 
social, political, financial, natural. This encompasses asset-based approaches that seek to 
strengthen household asset portfolios by increasing expected returns so that assets are more 
useful for risk management, especially in the face of disasters and shocks, and also to provide 
a broader range of instruments for risk management. Instruments include those focusing on: 
natural resource conservation, investments in social and physical infrastructure including 
transport infrastructure, market development, improved information flows, investments in 
agricultural research and extension to stabilise yields.  
 
One five-year pilot project focusing on livelihoods in the Jhang District in the Punjab has 
consequently improved economic opportunities for households and communities, as well as 
developing practical innovations for disaster preparedness. Because the area is prone to 
recurrent flooding, livestock was frequently moved a considerable distance from the 
communities otherwise the animals would face inadequate food supply during many weeks 




nutrient feed block for livestock, each block feeding one animal for one month. As a result, the 
risk of loss of cattle through drowning or theft during the move to far-flung higher pasture-land 
has decreased. Further, there are positive food-security effects on flood-affected families: 
because villagers were now able to keep cattle with them during flooding, they could now 
access milk and other diary products during the flooding season (DFID, 2006). 
 
Local/‘traditional’ coping strategies and community-based approaches to managing common 
property and other resources 
Case studies show that climate change is already having serious impacts on peoples‟ 
livelihoods. Communities in coastal areas (islands, tropical forests, drylands) in particular have 
had to adapt to a wide variety of hazards. These practices can potentially allow households to 
manage effectively adverse impacts of disaster risk as well as allowing them to capitalise on 
new opportunities. However, adaptability and the degree of vulnerability to disaster risk can be 
unevenly distributed between different ethnic groups and even within communities. Examples 
of traditional and innovative adaptation practices include:  
 
 shoreline reinforcement, coastal protection; 
 improved building technologies; 
 rainwater harvesting and using supplementary irrigation; 
 traditional farming techniques to protect watersheds; 
 changing hunting and gathering practices to match new seasonalities; 
 crop and livelihood diversification; 
 use of new materials; 
 community-based DRR.  
 
Bangladesh is expected to be one of the countries most heavily impacted by sea-level rise 
caused by climate change, due to its geography. Coastal peoples, whose livelihoods mainly 
depend on resources such as fisheries and mangroves, are expected to be severely affected 
by the effects of climate change and natural hazards. In this context, people principally use 
traditional strategies in response to disaster. Strategies include strengthening housing 
conditions, sheltering on higher ground, sale of land, developing fuel and dry food storage, 
and changing diets (Srinivasan, 2004). 
 
Conservation approaches 
Measures to protect and improve the natural resource base can help to address 
overexploitation of resources, strengthen livelihoods management as well as mitigate against 
disaster risk. One initiative that does just this is a Warwick University project aimed at 
improving affordable, domestic rainwater harvesting technology for the very low cost market in 
Ethiopia for drinking and perennial crop cultivation. The project, which ran from 2001-2003 
and funded by DFID, included models for rainwater harvesting ranging from simple 
opportunistic practices (for example where the water catchment may be a tree, the 
conveyance a banana leaf and the storage an earthen-ware pot) to highly sophisticated, 
electronically monitored systems (DFID, March 2006). 
 
 
Early Warning Systems 
 
The use of climate data in early warning and information systems is a key tool for mitigating 
disaster impacts that also enable better livelihood management and poverty reduction by 
averting or alleviating food security shocks.  
 
The Famine and Early Warning System Network (FEWSNET) is an initiative covering 17 
countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, as well as Afghanistan. A range of information products, 
tools and services provide decision-makers with up-to-date information necessary to forestall 




techniques and tools encompassing analysis of remotely-censored and ground-based early 
warning data and capacity-building for national and regional early warning systems; food 
security and vulnerability assessment methods, updates and briefings, contingency and 
response planning. 
 
At a national level, Mali has one of the earliest established services for providing climate-
related advice and recommendations directly to rural people, especially farmers, to help 
enable rural communities to manage the risks associated with rainfall variability. Since its 
launch over 25 years ago by the national meteorological service, the project has evolved and 
is now an extensive and effective collaboration between government agencies, research 
institutions, media, extension services, and farmers. One highly innovative element of the 
project present from its inception has been to help farmers to measure climate variables them-
selves, enabling them to incorporate climate information into their decision making, as well as 
supplying climate-related advice and recommendations directly to farmers. 
 
Role of government 
Local and national governments have a key role to play in policy formulation and 
implementation, including service and infrastructure provision, to ensure poverty reduction 
with disaster risk management.  One route is through embedding policy within the PRSP, 
integrating poverty reduction with disaster risk management efforts, and ensuring effective 
implementation.  
 
Table 5.2 Poverty-focused DRR embedded in selected PRSPs 
Country PRSP focus in relation to 
disaster risk 
Measures proposed 
Ethiopia Reducing vulnerability to drought in 
the longer run. 
 
National Policy on Disaster 
Prevention and Management as a 
new approach to tacking recurrent 
food emergencies through linking 
relief resources with development 
interventions. 
Water resource development improved 
agricultural technology, resettlement of people 
from densely settled food-insecure areas 
water sector strategy: measures to reduce the 
risks of flooding. 
 
Disaster Response capacities to be boosted 
through improved early warning systems, 
emergency food and cash reserves, and studies 
of vulnerability in food-insecure districts. 
Malawi The impact of weather-related 
calamities on the poor and the need 
to put in place adequate disaster 
management measures. 
Preparedness measures to focus on improving or 
using established global, regional and national 
early warning systems. 
 
Department of Disaster Prevention, Relief and 
Rehabilitation will be responsible for Emergency 
Relief Operations and rehabilitation projects. 
 
Safety nets programme to address chronic and 
„transient‟ poverty through combination of welfare 
transfers, targeted nutrition intervention, public 
works and targeted agricultural input provision. 
Vietnam By 2010, to reduce by half the 
number of poor people falling back 
into poverty due to disasters and 
other risks. 
Integrated approach incorporating employment 
generation for vulnerable people; 
support to improve school attendance of children 
in vulnerable families; 
fitting existing and new schools for seismic 
resistance; 
development of an Emergency Relief Fund. 
Bangladesh Integrated approach placing 
disaster risk management within 
mainstream development planning 
and programme/project design. 
Disaster risk management through 
comprehensive risk reduction: (i) effective EWS; 
(ii) institutionalised triggering mechanism for 




networking among public institutions, NGOs, 
community and individual household for 
integrated planning and coordination with 
decentralised responsibility to implement actions 
by actors before, during and after a disaster; and 
(iv) development and deployment of institutional, 
logistical and human capacity and skills through 
training, research, upgrading and regular 
maintenance of facilities for damage mitigation. 
Source: DFID (2004); Bangladesh PRSP (Government of the People‟s Republic of 
Bangladesh, 2005)  
5.3 The Role of Social Protection8 
This section examines opportunities for linking social protection and DRR exploring whether 
linking these approaches will help enhance resilience to shocks and stresses in rural 
communities vulnerable to disaster events. This involves examining firstly, how social 
protection can provide DRR with a preventative and holistic approach to poverty reduction. 
Secondly, we consider how, social protection can be disaster proofed through a long-term and 
inclusive approach in the context of disaster risk. The study does this by (i) reviewing the 
similarities and differences between DRR and social protection, by (ii) examining evidence 
from case studies of social protection interventions that co-manage rural poverty and disaster 
risks, and by (iii) highlighting the opportunities and requirements necessary to support DRR 
and social protection interventions in the future.  
 
Social Protection and DRR: Similarities and Differences 
 
The context 
Social protection has become a key policy response to risk, poverty and vulnerability in rural 
areas. For the purposes of this study social protection describes: all initiatives that transfer 
income or assets to the poor, protect the vulnerable against livelihood risks, and enhance the 
social status and rights of the marginalised. Its overall objectives are to extend the benefits of 
economic growth and reduce the economic or social vulnerability of poor, vulnerable and 
marginalised people. (IDS 2006; Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004).  
This definition is useful because it allows the distinction between four categories of objectives: 
provision measures, which provide relief from deprivation; preventive measures, designed to 
prevent deprivation; promotive measures, aimed at enhancing income and capabilities; and 
transformative measures, which seek to address concerns of social justice and exclusion 
(Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler, 2004).  
Disasters can have a huge impact on livelihood opportunities and on people‟s ability to cope 
with further stresses. Impacts such as loss of assets can lead to increased vulnerability of 
poor people and a “downward spiral of deepening poverty and increasing risk” (PLOW, 2007). 
DRR aims to make livelihoods more resilient to the impacts of disasters, hazards and shocks 
before the event. 
Linkages 
Social protection, and DRR have much in common, but have developed as separate 
disciplines over the last two decades (see table 5.3a below). They both seek to mitigate risks 
faced by poor people, they tackle the impact of and seek to build resilience against shocks 
                                                          
8
 Research and examples cited in this section are drawn from the paper Davies, M., Guenther, B., Leavy, J., 
Mitchell, T., and Tanner, T., 2008 ‘Climate Change Adaptation, Disaster Risk Reduction and Social Protection: 
Complimentary Role in Agriculture and Rural Growth?’ Brighton Institute of Development Studies, Centre for 






and stresses on livelihoods and they are all in relatively formative stages of development and 
testing, rather than established components of development and poverty reduction. The 
following examples demonstrate how, by linking the disciplines, weaknesses that exist when 
they work in isolation are addressed and, the potential they have to co-manage disaster risk 
and poverty reduction is utilised.  
 
Table 5.3a: Key Characteristics of Social Protection and DRR  
 Social protection  DRR 
Core disciplinary 
grounding  
Development and welfare 
economics  
Physical sciences 
Dominant focus Implementation of measures to 
manage risk 
Prevention of disaster events  
Main shocks and 
stresses 
addressed 
Multiple, idiosyncratic and 
covariant 
All natural hazard-related, 




Informal, OECD task group UN-ISDR Hyogo Framework for 
Action 
Main Funding  Ad hoc multilateral and  
bilateral  
Coordinated international 
funding: ISDR, GFDRR 
Ad hoc civil sponsored and 
bilateral  
 
Towards addressing structural constraints around poverty through social protection 
In the disasters field, the bulk of efforts and resources have been within relief and recovery 
designed to smooth the social impact of shocks. Despite renewed momentum and 
commitments, far less emphasis has been placed on preventative approaches associated with 
DRR that tackle disasters from a holistic perspective. 
 
Social protection has much to offer in helping the poorest reduce their exposure to current and 
future disaster shocks (table 5.3b). Joining these related agendas therefore means looking 
beyond simply protecting the most vulnerable to the impact of shocks and stresses, and 
towards prevention and promotion to address structural constraints around poverty.  
 
Table 5.3b: Promoting DRR and adaptation through social protection 
SP category Examples of SP instruments DRR benefits 
Protective 
(coping strategies) 
-social service provision 
-basic social transfers (food/cash) 
-social pension schemes  
-safety nets 
-public works programmes  
-protection of those most 




-social transfers  
-livelihood diversification 
-weather-indexed crop insurance 
-prevents damaging coping 






-access to credit 
-asset transfers or protection 
-starter packs (drought/flood-resistant) 
-access to common property 
resources 
-public works programmes 
- promotes resilience through 




-promotion of minority rights 
-anti-discrimination campaigns 
-social funds 
-transforms social relations to 
combat discrimination underlying 





Timeframe and limits: Driving longer term perspectives on social protection  
Many social protection interventions are planned over relatively short time frames. More 
recent social protection policies and programmes refer to the need for ‘long-term’ 
interventions. Nevertheless, how this will be achieved, and analysis of how long-term they 
need to be to achieve stated objectives, is rarely fully considered. Considering DRR in the 
context of social protection provides a strong incentive for developing longer term 
perspectives.  
DRR highlights the importance of considering how prevailing and future trends in disaster risk 
might affect the effectiveness of social protection measures, as well as how they might 
contribute to reducing vulnerability to shocks and stresses caused by disasters. Linking with 
the DRR agenda, therefore, exposes social protection to issues around its ability to support 
productive livelihoods in a face of increased disaster risk.  
People-centred and social aspects  
The social protection agenda based on a dominant safety net-based risk management 
approach has tended to focus on economic aspects of protection, in part a legacy of the World 
Bank‟s risk management framework. There is a consequent danger that by focusing on 
economic mechanisms rather than development objectives, social protection interventions 
have not fully addressed social poverty and social vulnerability including marginalisation and 
exclusion.  
Social aspects of vulnerability in DRR have similarly been challenged the dominance of 
physical science disciplines that have not engaged extensively with social development 
agendas. Opportunities are evident however, as recent disasters discourse and practice has 
started to pay greater attention to social and institutional aspects of DRR in the growing focus 
on community-based DRR and in the development of tools and methods to assess human 
vulnerability (Adger, 2003; Wisner et al 2004; Huq, 2007; IFRC 1999, Chiwaka 2005). 
Institutional capacity and coordination 
DRR and social protection share a need to link policy and actions with wider aspects of human 
development and economic growth. If social protection is to produce positive social and 
economic outcomes, synergies need to be made with other disciplines that address the 
multiple dimensions of poverty. At country level, social protection policies are often 
implemented in isolation, not within poverty reduction frameworks or growth strategies. 
Ministries responsible for implementation (e.g. Ministries of social welfare) are commonly 
poorly resourced and marginalised and are poorly placed to provide the necessary links. 
DRR is often found in response or disaster management agencies, rather than as part of 
development or mainstream politics. This has frustrated the cross-sectoral links necessary for 
work on the multi dimensions of poverty reduction as these focal point ministries tend to be 
poorly resourced and relatively weak within the government system.  
Instrumentalism vs. rights based approaches 
Social protection has been crudely divided into two approaches (Devereux and Sabates-
Wheeler 2007). The first is underpinned by instrumentalist arguments for social protection to 
efficient delivery of the MDGs. Social protection thereby puts in place risk management 
mechanisms where they are temporarily missing due to poverty and the absence of private 
institutions.  
Within DRR a similar rationale can be identified in risk management based approaches where 
risk reduction is seen as means to an end, and economic analysis builds the evidence base to 
advocate for DRR as cost-effective means of preventing future negative impacts on 




The activist arguments underpinning social protection as an inviolable right to combat social 
injustice and inequality also have parallels with DRR debates. Social protection rationale is 
informed by the ideal of a guaranteed „universal social minimum‟ based on citizenship rather 
than philanthropy or self-interest (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2007). Approaches to DRR 
in the context of adaptation reflect these arguments. Here, adaptation in poor communities is 
regarded as a necessary response to a problem caused by richer people globally but with 
impacts felt most severely by poorer citizens who have contributed least to the problem 
(Paavola and Adger 2006).  
A key implication for designing and implementing social protection in the context of disaster 
risk extreme is therefore likely to be an enhanced engagement with rights and equity based 
arguments around disaster risk.  
5.4 Linkages in Practice 
Country experiences of social protection instruments - weather-indexed crop insurance, cash 
transfers, free input distribution and seed fairs - reveal how these measures can enhance the 
resilience of vulnerable communities and point to ways in which social protection measures 
could be more resilient to current and future disaster related shocks. In the context of 
agriculture, where links between the two disciplines are more developed, we consider both the 
potential for expansion along with the challenges that are needed to be overcome. 
 
Weather-indexed crop insurance 
As disaster impacts become increasingly critical to agriculture production in developing 
countries, insurance is likely to play a greater role in absorbing shocks and spreading risk. 
Weather-indexed crop insurance develops a contract written against a weather index, and 
farmers collect immediate insurance compensation if the index reaches a certain point or 
“trigger”, regardless of actual losses.  
 
The pilot project undertaken by the Government of Malawi, the World Bank, International 
Research Institute for Climate and Society (IRI) and the National Smallholder Farmers 
Association of Malawi (NASFAM) provides empirical evidence of the use of weather-indexed 
crop insurance for groundnut production in a DRR context. Through the scheme, farmers 
entered into a loan agreement with an interest rate that includes a weather insurance 
premium. The loan enabled households to access an input package which included improved 
groundnut seed. In the event of a severe drought (as measured by the rainfall index), the 
borrower would pay only a fraction of the loan due, while the rest is paid by the insurer directly 
to the lender. The insurance guarantee against the loan allows high-risk and low-income 
farmers to obtain credit to invest in seeds and other inputs for higher yielding crops (Helmuth, 
et al 2007). 
 
In India, a local micro-finance institution, BASIX, and an insurance company, ICICI Lombard 
along with the Commodity Risk Management Group and the World Bank have pioneered a 
rainfall insurance scheme in Andhra Pradesh. Similar to the Malawian scheme, the contracts 
ensured a prompt payout when rain falls below a crop-specific rainfall index. ICICI Lombard 
underwrote the insurance polices and reinsured the risks with an international reinsurance 
company. Individual farmers and self-help groups articulated product satisfaction in all of the 
pilot areas. Prompt settlement of claims in 2004 won the appreciation of the farmers who 
expressed their willingness in becoming repeat customers in 2005 (Manuamorn 2005).  
 
The weather-indexed approach guards against problems of adverse selection and moral 
hazard because regardless of whether the insurance is paid out or not, farmers still have an 
incentive to make productive management decisions (Hellmuth et al 2007; Hess and Syroka 
2005). The timeliness of payouts means that farmers are not forced to adopt costly coping 
strategies, such as the sale of productive assets, and are able to smooth their consumption by 




may also strengthen resilience and support productive enterprises through greater risk taking 
experimentation in agriculture practices that was not possible in crop-insurance schemes. As 
insured households and farms are more creditworthy, insurance can also promote 
investments in productive assets and higher-risk/higher-yield crops (Mechler et al 2006). 
Despite these advances, key challenges facing the expansion of weather-indexed insurance in 
light of DRR include (Mechler et al 2006; Hellmuth et al 2007; Holmes et al 2007): 
 Difficulties in targeting those most vulnerable to drought and food insecurity, engaged in 
non-commercial marginal agriculture; 
 Failure to tackle differentiated gender impacts;  
 High premiums may preclude involvement of very poor groups, who often live in areas of 
high climate risk;  
 Capital costs such as the construction of weather stations must be funded by either the 
public or private sector to ensure broad coverage; 
 Climate change presents significant uncertainty in predicting long-term weather patterns 
making it difficult to accurately assess financial risk; 
 Increased climatic variability and occurrence of extreme events may result in larger and/or 
more frequent insurance payouts resulting in the possible insolvency of the insurance 
provider or higher premiums from re-insurers which may be inaccessible to the poor. 
 
Cash transfers  
Cash transfer programmes are gaining momentum as both a disaster risk and an overall 
poverty reduction strategy (see Barrientos 2006). Redistributive cash transfers can help raise 
incomes and smooth the consumption of the poor, allowing them to engage in moderate risk-
taking, and to protect rather than erode their asset holdings when confronted by livelihood 
shocks (Devereux and Sabates-Wheeler 2004). Furthermore, cash transfer programmes may 
contribute to asset-building as well as the generation of economic multiplier effects, through 
the generation of local employment (GTZ 2005; Mattinen and Ogden 2006; Slater et al 2006; 
DFID 2004; Devereux 2006).  
Predictable cash transfers could play an important role in mitigating the vulnerability of the 
chronic poor who will increasingly be exposed to disaster related shocks and stresses. 
Preliminary lessons form Ethiopia‟s Productive Safety Net Programme (PSNP) reveal a 
positive effects on household food consumption as well as the protection of household assets 
(Devereux et al 2006; Slater et al 2006; Vaitla 2006). The PSNP contributed to a reduction in 
„distress selling‟ of assets, provided an opportunity for households to create assets, and 
contributed positive impacts on human capital through increased school enrolment and access 
to health services (Slater et al 2006).  
Repeated transfers at predictable and regular intervals allow recipients to spread risk and to 
plan spending and investment behaviour over longer timeframes. Larger and continuous cash 
provisions are more likely to lead to lead to the asset accumulation and poverty reduction (and 
therefore risk reduction) than occasional or erratic transfers (Devereux and Coll-Black 2007; 
Marcus 2007). Although potentially offering important opportunities to address multiple 
dimensions of poverty and support DRR, the long-term impact requires some caution. Many 
cash transfer programmes in the context of DRR have been implemented quite recently or 
over a short-time frame.  Lack of available evidence on the impact over a longer-time frame is 
therefore, limited. Finally, in addressing the multi-dimensions of poverty and achieve wider 
development outcomes (e.g. growth, health and education), cash transfer need to be placed 
alongside, and support, other complimentary interventions.  
Starter packs and seed fairs 
In response to calls to develop and distribute crop varieties that are drought and saline 
resistant, programmes for distribution of free inputs or inputs-for-work have become 
increasingly popular, especially across Africa. Input distribution has been a common response 




enhancing access to seeds and fertiliser. The distribution of fertiliser and seeds for free is 
intended to enhance food security by boosting food production among farmers who are unable 
to obtain such inputs. Evaluation of starter pack programmes in Malawi reveal success in 
boosting food production at the national level and household level food security (Devereux 
and Coll-Black 2007).  
While popular among donors, critics argue that inputs sourced through commercial seed and 
fertiliser companies are often inappropriate to local cropping patterns and agro-ecological 
conditions, can potentially distort local seed markets, and reduce crop diversity. Other critics 
of input distribution argue that such measures misdiagnose the inaccessibility of inputs with 
unavailability, and fail to assist in keeping seeds stocks year on year (Barahona and Cromwell 
2005; Orindi and Ochieng 2005; Thompson, et al 2007; Devereux and Coll-Black 2007). 
As an alternative to traditional input distribution programmes, a seed voucher and fair 
programme was developed in Kenya‟s semi-arid region in response to prolonged drought. 
Farmers were encouraged to bring their surplus seeds to fair sites where voucher holders 
were able to select seeds of their choice. On completion of the seed fair, seed retailers 
redeemed their vouchers for cash.  
In contrast to the package of inputs approach which risks undermining biological diversity and 
leads to mono-cropping, seed vouchers and fairs have encouraged farmers to maintain crop 
diversity on their farms, contributing socio-ecological resilience. Seed voucher and fairs 
programmes have been found to be substantially more cost-effective than traditional input 
distribution approaches, as well as providing an opportunity for greater information sharing 
among farmers (Orindi and Ochieng 2005).  
 
Other examples include a Practical Action supported pilot in post-tsunami areas of Sri Lanka 
to trial 10 traditional saline-resistant varieties which had been present before the introduction 
of higher yielding varieties. These help increase resilience in light of sea-level rises in low lying 
areas. The RVCC programme in Bangladesh has similarly encouraged the planting of saline 
tolerant non-rice crops such as maize and grass during season when rice cannot be grown, 
increasing soil nutrient levels and providing fodder for cattle.  
 
Traditional input transfer programmes may be a tempting method to distribute crop drought- or 
saline-tolerant crop varieties; however, such programmes can undercut local seed markets 
and ignore indigenous knowledge. Furthermore, such free input distribution may in fact 
increase vulnerability to disasters by ignoring particular agro-ecological contexts and 
undermining crop diversity. However if, in the design of seed vouchers and fairs, these factors 
are considered and mitigated, they present a cost-effective way to assist post-disaster 
recovery and enhance resilience by promoting crop diversity and information sharing between 
farmers.  
5.5 Conclusions 
This section of the report illustrates how, by taking care to manage rural poverty alongside 
disaster risk, poor and vulnerable people in rural areas typically less equipped to deal with 
shocks and disasters can withstand the increasing threat of disasters on their lives and 
livelihoods. This can be achieved by focusing on measures to help reduce vulnerability to 
both. These can be extensions of approaches already taken in relation to strengthening and 
diversifying livelihoods and asset bases, protecting and preserving the natural resource base 
and rooted in coping strategies already adopted by local people. The use of climate data in 
early warning and information systems is an important and established mechanism to mitigate 
disaster impacts that also enable better livelihood management and poverty reduction by 





Further, by linking social protection with DRR, clear poverty and disaster risk overlaps are 
made. Case studies demonstrate how social protection interventions can provide DRR with a 
preventative and holistic poverty approach. In protecting the most vulnerable and poor, and 
prevent damaging coping strategies, it can promote resilience in the face of disaster risk. 
Finally, if a broader approach to social protection is implemented, it can extend beyond 
income poverty and transform social relations to combat underlying and social vulnerability. To 
enable social protection to achieve these objectives, we emphasised how social protection 
though a DRR perspective provides it with a longer-term and inclusive approach to poverty 
and vulnerability. National political ownership provides the greatest opportunities to support 
this partnership. Here, linkages can be operationalised by building on existing political 
acceptance and ownership around the disaster risk and poverty reduction agenda, embedding 
policy integrating poverty reduction with disaster risk management efforts within the PRSP and 
ensuring effective implementation. The policy implications of this approach are discussed in 
section 6.  
 
6 Summary and Recommendations 
The first section considered the complex relationship between rural poverty and exposure to 
hazards, by analysing the specificities of rural dimensions of poverty and by examining 
sources and impacts of hazards and stresses on poor rural people‟s livelihoods. By reflecting 
on examples of seasonality and AIDS, the section concluded that the relationship between 
rural poverty and hazards is complex and interconnected.  
 
 Exposure to a hazard undermines livelihoods, simultaneously causing and exacerbating 
poverty.  
 A hazard is more likely to impact negatively on an already compromised livelihood system, 
because resilience and ability to cope are diminished.  
 The impacts of a hazard are unequally felt across different wellbeing maps, with poorer 
people and households more likely to experience negative and more severe impacts from 
a hazard than better-off groups.  
 Poverty is itself hazardous.  
 Low incomes raise vulnerability to hazards, because the poor are less able to cope with 
shocks to their fragile livelihoods. 
 
The second section discussed what is meant by „vulnerability‟ and how rural poverty 
contributes to and exacerbates a variety of vulnerabilities and hazards. The section concluded 
that poverty and vulnerability reinforce each other. We also found that:  
 
 Everyone is vulnerable to food insecurity, social exclusion, natural disasters and other 
hazards, but the poor are more vulnerable because they are more exposed to these risks 
and are more likely to experience a larger and more prolonged (even irreversible) impact 
due to their limited (physical, financial, social and political) assets.  
 Assets usually reduce both poverty and vulnerability to livelihood shocks.  
 In some perverse cases assets can increase vulnerability, but these are unusual 
circumstances.  
 The importance of voice and influence over people with power cannot be overstated; it is 
critical for determining whether poor people must attempt to cope with hazards on their 
own or can count on external assistance in times of stress.  
 
The third section explored how the processes that link rural and urban either produce or 
reduce disaster risk for poor people living in rural areas. By analysing how migration and 
decentralisation influence levels of vulnerability and exposure to hazards, the section found 
that these processes have a profound affect on both rural poverty and disaster risk, 





 migration is a complex process that has both positive and negative impacts on the levels 
of extensive disaster risk 
 the existence and growth of urban areas themselves generates extensive rural disaster 
risk, and this is likely to accelerate given the pressures of climate change on agrarian 
systems, which will force more people into urban or peri-urban environments. 
 While decentralisation of poverty reduction and DRM has benefits in participation and 
recognition of local needs, many local governments in rural areas are ill-equipped to 
promote rural development or to tackle disaster risk as they lack skills and resources.  
 There is very limited evidence to suggest that decentralisation either reduces poverty or 
enhances effective disaster risk management.  
 
Section four examined the potential threats and opportunities posed by climate change for 
poor people in rural areas. It concluded that:  
 
 The impacts of climate change on rural livelihoods will be overlaid onto existing variability 
in the climate and the multiple shocks and stresses faced by rural communities.  
 Rural poverty will also face both potentially positive and negative impacts from efforts to 
mitigate the climate change problem.  
 While climate change is commonly presented as a gradual shift in climatic trends, its 
impacts will be most strongly felt by poor rural communities through changes in the 
distribution, nature and magnitude of extreme weather events.  
 Adapting to these changes will require bolstering DRR as a first line of defence, including 
disaster prevention as well as response.  
 
Section five sets out different approaches to managing rural poverty alongside disaster risk, 
focusing on measures that can help reduce vulnerability to both. It examined a series of short 
case studies, exploring the scope of social protection for dealing with the poverty impacts of 
disasters. It concluded that:  
 When external social protection assistance is guaranteed – for instance, where predictable 
and social security systems provide effective safety nets against shocks – the catastrophic 
consequences of hazards can be substantially contained. 
 By linking social protection with DRR, clear poverty and disaster risk overlaps are made. 
Case studies demonstrate how social protection interventions can provide DRR with a 
preventative and holistic poverty approach.  
 Finally, if a broader approach to social protection is implemented, it can extend beyond 
income poverty and transform social relations to combat underlying and social 
vulnerability.  
 
As a set of summary recommendations, policy interventions to tackle rural poverty and 
disaster-risk need to reduce or spread risk or strengthen resilience. This can be achieved 
through: 
 
 Building the asset base of poor rural people 
o Supporting the diversification of their livelihoods 
o Providing social insurance mechanisms 
o Making climate change and seasonal forecast data available to farmers in 
suitable formats 
o Supporting social safety nets 
 Mainstreaming DRR into PRSPs 
o Integrating local government disaster risk management within national 
development programmes and supporting the capacity of civil society to hold 
local governments to account.  
 




 encompass measures to build up the asset base of (poor) people in rural areas to act as 
buffers against shocks and help reduce vulnerability to hazards. These include measures 
that not only strengthen existing asset bases but also those that enable people to create/ 
access assets such as essential inputs for farming, irrigation; 
 maintain access to assets and minimise disruption in event of hazard/ disaster. Where 
livelihoods are fragile this will better enable rural people to manage new types and sources 
of change, and enhance ability to smooth income and consumption without resorting to 
„distress‟ sales of assets when faced with impact/ risk of hazards; 
 if households do resort to these kinds of coping strategies, policy should enable them to 
rebuild assets in a timely way so as to avoid „poverty ratchet‟ effect, so keeping poor rural 
people above asset thresholds. 
 enable poor people in rural areas to adopt coping mechanisms that preserve the key 
productive resources of the household to improve resilience to future shocks and hazards 
and build the ability to adapt to multiple aspects of a changing environment, for example 
through improving access to affordable, domestic rainwater harvesting technology. 
 
DRR must form a closer relationship with social protection. In the context of national 
ownership, Programmes featuring a partnership between the two disciplines should include: 
 An emphasis on transforming productive livelihoods as well as protecting, and adapting to 
changing climate conditions rather than simply reinforcing coping mechanisms. 
 Grounding in an understanding of the structural root causes of poverty in a particular 
region or sector, permitting more effective targeting of vulnerability to multiple shocks and 
stresses. 
 Incorporation of entitlements-based rationale for action that addresses social exclusion, 
stressing equity and justice dimensions of poverty and DRR in addition to instrumentalist 
rationale based primarily on economic efficiency. 
 An enhanced role for research from both the natural and social sciences to inform the 
development and targeting of social protection policies and measures in the context of the 
burden of both geophysical hazards and changing disaster risks. 
 A longer-term perspective for social protection policies that takes into account the 
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